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ABSTRACT

Bankruptcy law does not deal well with website promises to
protect personal information. The legal treatment of privacy
policies in bankruptcy currently turns on whether such policies
are viewed as creating contract rights or property rights. Neither
characterizationfits well, and any attempt to shoehorn information privacy into either category has significant costs. Contract
obligations are subject to discharge in bankruptcy, and any
consumer expectations of privacy (contractualor otherwise) are
likely to be defeated. By contrast, if personal information is deemed
property of the website customer, information transfers that might
benefit consumerswill be stifled. This Article develops an approach,
based on "muddyproperty rights," that has the potentialto strike an
appropriatebalance between these two extremes.
The property/contractdistinctionwithin bankruptcy law mirrors
a broaderdiscussion in the legal academy, begun by Calabresiand
Melamed, about the proper domain of property and liability. The,
debate among privacy scholars about data privacy similarly
tracks the Calabresiandivide. Larry Lessig favors propertization
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of personal information, while other privacy advocates, such as
Marc Rotenberg and Jessica Litman, oppose Lessig's proposal
because they believe commodifying personal information will
ultimately be destructive ratherthan protective ofprivacy. All three
misunderstandthe effect ofproperty on privacy: Lessig ex ante, and
Rotenberg and Litman ex post. Lessig's focus on remedy (following
both Calabresi and Coase) assumes that the content of the
substantive right to information privacy is irrelevant, because an
efficient allocation of rights will ultimately be reached, one way or
another,by private negotiation.However, contractualnegotiationis
not always an efficient mechanism for allocating entitlements.
Adhesion, information asymmetries, and coordination problems
raisethorny issues where e-commerce transactionsare concerned.In
these transactions,one cannot rely on private negotiationor markets
to generate the appropriateterms for data sharing.Rotenberg and
Litman, by contrast, ignore the fact that without the status of
"property,"informationprivacy norms will go entirely unenforced in
bankruptcy.
By focusing on remedy, the information privacy literature has
failed to explore the interactionbetween substantive rights (which
can be crystalline or muddy), and remedies (which can be based in
property or liability). I arguethat "muddy property rights"based on
fair information practices point the way toward a more nuanced
approach to the interaction between right and remedy. As I have
discussed in earlier work, muddy rules serve a dual function: (1)
they deter troubling transactions;and (2) they force contracting
parties, ex ante, to recognize that they might have to justify their
contractual terms ex post. In the information privacy context,
however, muddy entitlements, and muddy property rights in particular,could serve a third purpose. They would force information
into the legal system about norm-relatedbehavior,and allow judges
and the judiciary to enforce and articulateprivacy norms through
the incremental development of common law rules.
In short, if privacy norms for e-commerce transactionsare to be
enforced in bankruptcy, they need to be protectedby property rights,
and if they are to be generated by public dialogue and public
processes, those property rights should be muddy.
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No statutory draftsman has a crystal ball in which he can read
the future. The best he can do is make some kind of sense out of
the recentpast.A well-drafted statute will deal sensibly with the
issues which have come into litigation during the twenty or
twenty-five years which preceded the drafting. However, the
focus of litigation has a way of shifting unexpectedly and
unpredictably. New issues, which no one ever dreamed of,
present themselves for decision. With luck, the statute will turn
out to have nothing to say that is relevant to the new issues,
which can then be decided on their own merits.1

INTRODUCTION

Imagine that it is February 2000. The dot-corn boom is resonating
through the economy. Yachoo Corporation (Yachoo), the owner of a
website called "Yachoo.com,"2 has just gone public. Yachoo.com is
the brainchild of CEO and principal shareholder Max Headcold, and
sells herbal and nutritional supplements over the World Wide Web.
Yachoo's marketing focuses particularly on cold remedies. When
customers visit the Yachoo.com website they are asked to provide
certain information about their particular respiratory ailments,
or, as the case may be, their personal fitness goals. Yachoo's
proprietary software then uses this information to provide the
customer with a tailored herbal regimen. These customers have
value in two ways: as relationships (i.e., people who buy Yachoo's
products), and as information (i.e., preferences of people who might
be convinced to buy other people's products).
1. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 96 (1977).

2. Yachoo-com is a purely fictitious company that first made its appearance as a
teaching hypo at the Second Annual Zaretsky Roundtable at the Brooklyn Law School on
April 11, 2000. The Zaretsky Roundtable is an annual event where bankruptcy lawyers and
professors gather to talk about bankruptcy and to honor the memory of Barry Zaretsky, an
extraordinary bankruptcy scholar and teacher at the Brooklyn Law School from 1978 until
his untimely death in 1997. For an updated version of the teaching materials for that
program, see Neil Cohen, Michael Gerber, and Edward J. Janger, Bankruptcy in a Brave eWorld: Planningfor the Day a Dot-corn Crashes, in WORKOUTS & BANKRUPTCIES IN THE ECOMMERCE ECONOMY 247 (Joseph Samet & John Walshe Murray eds., 2001) [hereinafter ECOMMERCE]. Yachoo's first fictitious attempt to sell private information actually predates
Toysmart's by a few months.
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Needless to say, this information would be valuable to other
companies interested in marketing the latest form of high-tech
tissue paper or ultrasonic vaporizer to Yachoo's customers. Yachoo,
however, has posted a privacy policy on its website that states in no
uncertain terms:
WE WILL NOT SHARE YOUR PERSONAL INFORMATION
WITH THIRD PARTIES UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. WE
MEAN IT! WE MEAN IT! WE MEAN IT!!!!
Yachoo made this promise because Headcold felt that many of
Yachoo's customers would be more comfortable doing business with
Yachoo if they believed that their information would be held in
confidence. Headcold also felt that when the time came to sell hightech tissue paper or ultrasonic vaporizers to their customers,
Yachoo would simply branch out into those businesses.
Now, fast forward to March 2003. Yachoo has fallen upon hard
times, and has decided to reorganize under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. During the planning discussions, you (Yachoo's
lawyer) and Headcold explore a number of options. The first plan is
to obtain financing and seek to continue the business. The second
plan is to liquidate the assets of the business, either in whole or in
part, carving up the various pieces in order to obtain the most
value. Headcold also recognizes that reorganizing may require
Yachoo to sell off some of its assets to raise cash. In this connection,
Headcold turns to you and asks two questions: (1) "Given our
privacy policy, can we sell Yachoo's customers with their personal
information?"; and (2) "Can we sell that information without the
customers' permission?" Your initial attempt to answer these questions would begin and, under current law, end with the somewhat
delphic, and widely reported, story of Toysmart.com-a cautionary
tale that simultaneously left Toysmart unable to sell its customer
data, and struck fear into the hearts of privacy advocates.
In the spring of 2000, an involuntary bankruptcy petition was
filed against Toysmart.com.' Notwithstanding a published privacy
policy under which it, like Yachoo, had promised not to sell personal
customer information, Toysmart's liquidation consultants sought to
3. In re Toysmart.com, LLC, No. 00-13995-CJK (Bankr. D. Mass. filed June 9, 2000).
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sell the company's customer lists.4 Public outcry and an FTC
investigation stopped the Toysmart data sale in its tracks, and
spawned a number of legislative proposals, including an amendment to the Bankruptcy Code introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy
(Leahy Amendment), contained in sections 231 and 232 of the
Conference Report 5 on the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2002 (Bankruptcy Reform Bill).' This
Article seeks to show that both the Leahy Amendment and recent
scholarly proposals, by Larry Lessig7 and others, to protect data
4. Stipulation and [Proposed] Order Establishing Conditions on Sale of Customer
Information, presented by Toysmart.com, LLC and the Federal Trade Commission, reprinted
in Samet & Murray, E-COMMERCE supra note 2, at 9 [hereinafter Toysmart Stipulation]
(reproducing a stipulation and proposed order placing conditions on the sale of customer
information by Toysmart.com).
5. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 107-617, at 51-52 (2002) [hereinafter Conference Report]. The
Leahy Amendment is reproduced in the Appendix of this Article.
6. H.R. 333, 107th Cong. (2002). While the House and Senate each passed slightly
different versions of the Bankruptcy Reform Bill by veto-proof majorities, one delay after
another prevented the bill's enactment. Utimately, it died at the end of the 107th Congress.
First it became the battleground over which the Senate leadership battled out the rules for
power sharing in the deadlocked Senate. Agreement was reached, only to have Senator
Jeffords switch party affiliations and again reshape the balance of power in the Senate. The
Conference Committee was finally named and held its first meeting, only to be delayed
indefinitely by the events of September 11, 2001. See Riva D. Atlas, Democrats Review
Changes in Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,2002, at C8. In November 2001, the Conference
Committee met again to discuss the bill, but by that time, the country had slipped into
recession, and enthusiasm for a bill that, by all accounts, restricts the availability of
bankruptcy relief to individual consumer debtors appeared to wane. Id. The Conference
Committee again met in January 2002, and, in the wake of Enron's bankruptcy filing,
attention turned to provisions like the securitization safe harbor contained in § 912 of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act, which were removed because it was feared that they might facilitate
financial deception. Id. Differences also remained over a provision capping homestead
exemptions, and another making debts resulting from violent protests at abortion clinics nondischargeable. Id. The Republicans then proposed a compromise. See Rep. F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr., Remarks before the Credit Union National Association (Feb. 27, 2002),
availableat http://www.house.gov/judiciary/sensenbrenner022702.htm (last visited Feb. 25,
2003). In August, an agreement was reached on the homestead cap, and Representative Hyde
and Senator Schumer reached an agreement on the abortion clinic violence provision, but
right-to-life members of Congress were not satisfied by that language. See Juliet Eilperin,
Abortion Fight Might Scuttle Bankruptcy Bill, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2002, at Al. The Bill
ultimately died during the lame duck session, when the House leadership was unable to get
a majority to bring the Conference Report to a vote. Congress then voted out a version of the
Bill which deleted the abortion clinic violence provision. The Senate, however, declined to act
on that version of the Bill. The Bill is likely to be introduced at some point during the next
Congress, but whether it will contain the Leahy Amendment is impossible to predict.
7. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 160 (1999).

1808

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1801

privacy through propertization are legally and intellectually
incoherent for a common reason. Both focus on remedy without
paying sufficient attentionto the substantiveprivacy norms at stake.
The Toysmart story and its legislative coda raise three related
questions, each of which implicates a common failing in bankruptcy
law and in the scholarly literature on data privacy. First, should an
entitlement to data privacy be protected by a crystalline legal rule
or a muddier standard? Second, should privacy be protected as a
property right or merely by liability-based civil damages?9 And,
third, does the answer to either of these questions change when a
dot-coin becomes insolvent? ° The weakness of current law and
current scholarship is that scholars, judges, and legislators focus
separately on the content of the right to personal data privacy,"
and on the status of that right as property or liability. 2 They fail to
8. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in PropertyLaw, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 592
(1988) (reviewing the debate between advocates of crystalline rules and advocates of muddy
standards in connection with property law); see also infra note 38.
9. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV 1089, 1089 (1972).
10. For an introduction to the so-called "judgment proof" problem, see Steven Shavell,
The Judgment ProofProblem, 6 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 45, 45 (1986) ("An injurer will treat
liability that exceeds his assets as imposing an effective financial penalty only equal to his
assets ..... ). See also Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1996).
LoPucki analogizes the risk of loss to a card game:
Think of the liability system as a poker game .... Players risk their chips, that
is, their wealth, by tossing them into the pot, that is, investing them in liabilitygenerating economic activity. Chips contributed to the pot are at risk of loss;
the system can take them to satisfy liability. Chips withheld are not at risk.
Id.
11. The privacy literature focuses on the development of "Fair Information Principles,"
or "FIPs," largely without regard to whether the remedy should be based in liability or
property. Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standardsfor FairInformation Practicesin the U.S.
Private Sector, 80 IowA L. REV. 497, 504-06 (1995); Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information
Practicesand the Architecture ofPrivacy (What Larry Doesn't Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
1, 26-39 (2001), available at httpJ/stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/01_STLR l (last visited
Feb. 25, 2003); Paul M. Schwartz,Privacy and Participation,80 IOWAL. REV. 553 (1995); see
also FED. TRADE COMM., PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7-14 (1998) (discussing
"fair information practice principles").
12. As discussed below, the Bankruptcy Code treatment of privacy promises turns on
whether the right is characterized as property or contract based. 11 U.S.C. §§ 363, 365
(2000). Indeed, some privacy scholars, Larry Lessig among them, see propertization of
personal information as the solution to the Toysmart problem. See LESSIG, supra note 7, at
160. According to Lessig:
The law would be a kind of property right in privacy. Individuals must have
both the ability to negotiate easily over privacy rights and the entitlement to

20031

MUDDY PROPERTY

1809

consider how the substantive content of a right interacts with its
remedy. Most importantly, however, they fail to consider how right
interacts with remedy when the debtor goes bankrupt. 3
In this Article, I use personal information transactions and the
treatment of privacy policies in bankruptcy as a frame to demonstrate that it is impossible to solve (1) the "right" problem (crystals
v. mud), (2) the "remedy" problem (property v. liability), or (3) what
economists call the "judgment proof' problem, in isolation.' 4
Instead, I propose a mechanism based on "muddy property rights"
that has the potential, over time, to solve all three problems
together. I conclude that liability-based approaches to personal
information transactions will not provide sufficient protection to
website customers when a dot-coin becomes insolvent or files for
bankruptcy. It is premature, however, to develop a bright-line
property entitlement that establishes the scope of data privacy
rights in bankruptcy. Neither Congress nor the courts are likely to
know the correct rule. E-commerce transactions are new, and the
uses and abuses of personal data in the information economy are
moving targets. Indeed, privacy policies that prohibit data
disclosure, like the Toysmart policy, have virtually disappeared
from the marketplace. As a result, any rule adopted today is likely
to be wrong a year from now. Instead, I propose a general
framework for thinking about data privacy in bankruptcy based on
"muddy property rights." I argue that muddy property will
encourage generation of information within the legal system about
transactions in personal information and will encourage the
piecemeal articulation (largely by bankruptcy judges) of appropriate
legally enforceable norms for such transactions. Crystallization may
follow, but with the benefit of more information and, perhaps, with
fewer train wrecks along the way.
"Remedy" divorced from "right."Perhaps perversely, untangling
the treatment of privacy policies in bankruptcy begins with remedy
rather than right. In his provocative book, Code and Other Laws of
privacy as a default. That is property's purpose: it says to those who want, you
must negotiate before you can take. P3P is the architecture to facilitate that
negotiation; the law is the rule that says negotiation must occur.

Id.
13. See infra notes 90-144 and accompanying text.
14. See Shavell, supra note 10, at 45.
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Cyberspace, Larry Lessig proposes to solve the problem of privacy
in cyberspace by propertizing nonpublic personal information.15 On
the one hand, while bankruptcy illustrates the necessity of a
property-based protection for privacy rights, the task may not be as
simple as he thinks. Propertization has some crucial benefits, but
it also has some serious costs. The bankruptcy treatment of privacy
policies turns on whether a privacy policy creates a right
enforceable only through civil damages, or a right with the status
of property."' If bankruptcy courts treat privacy policies solely as
contract obligations, the debtor will be free to breach (or reject) the
contract in bankruptcy.17 Any damage claim will be treated as a
prepetition claim," paid, if at all, at a significant discount. 19
Consumer expectations of privacy, contractual or otherwise, are
likely to be defeated.20 By contrast, if personal information is
deemed property subject to a license or encumbrance, then the
property interest must be respected, or to use the bankruptcy term,
given "adequate protection."2 At first glance, this seems to be an
improvement. Unfortunately, there is no well-developed mechanism
for determining the meaning of adequate protection in the context
of a sale of personal data, or for selling the data free of multiple
overlapping property interests. 22 A so-called "anticommons" may
result from these overlapping vetoes, stifling information
transfers, and depriving debtors of a valuable asset.2' Neither
characterization fits well, and any attempt to shoehorn e-commerce
15. LESSIG, supra note 7, at 160.
16. See infra text accompanying note 71.

17. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2000).
18. Id. § 365(g).
19. Id. § 502.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 90-109.

21. 11 U.S.C. § 361.
22. Id. § 363(f). Section 365(f) provides a mechanism for selling property free and clear
of other interests, but for reasons that I will discuss below, the unsettled status and form of

rights to use and sell personal information are sufficiently ill-formed that this section does
not work well, and under current case law may not work at all. See Gouveia v. Tazbir, 37

F.3d 295, 299 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that debtor is unable to sell land free and clear of
restrictive covenants).
23. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Propertyin the Transition

from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621,624 (1998) ("When there are too many owners
holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse-a tragedy of the
anticommons.*); see also Edward J. Janger, Privacy Property, Information Costs and the
Anticommons, 54 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2003).
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privacy policies into either the pure property or the pure liability
category has significant costs. Bright-line property-based protection
fails because coordination problems exist and the entitlement's
content is unformed. Liability-based protection fails because, in
bankruptcy, liability-based protection is no protection at all.
Bankruptcy law is not the only doctrinal ship to run aground
on the shoals of the property/liability distinction. This Article is
informed by, and seeks to inform, a broader discussion among nonbankruptcy scholars, begun by Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas
Melamed, about the proper status of entitlements as property
or liability.24 Property rules are viewed as reflecting undivided
entitlements. They allocate, as Carol Rose puts it, the "whole
meatball" to the owner. 25 Liability rules, by contrast, are viewed as
dividing an entitlement between two parties. One party holds the
right, but the other party is given the option to take the right and
compensate the right holder for the deprivation, in other words, to
breach and pay damages. 26 Like the Bankruptcy Code, Calabresi
and Melamed focus on remedy and the optimal line between
property and liability. They seek to draw that line according to
the relative costs of bargaining over the various rights. When
bargaining is cheap and information symmetric, property rules predominate. When bargaining is costly, liability rules predominate.
24. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1092. Calabresi and Melamed framed the
issue as follows:
The state not only has to decide whom to entitle, but it must also [decide] the
manner in which entitlements are protected and ... whether an individual is
allowed to sell or trade the entitlement. In any given dispute, for example, the
state must decide not only which side wins but also the kind of protection to
grant.
Id. The set of "liability" rules goes beyond contract-based rights, and includes tort-based
liability as well. In this regard, tort claims suffer the same fate in bankruptcy as contractbased claims, and could be subjected to virtually the same analysis. See Lynn M. LoPucki,
The Unsecured Creditor'sBargain,80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1896-1916 (1994).
25. Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2179 (1997).
26. See id. at 2178-79.
27. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1106. Professors Calabresi and Melamed note:
In terms of economic efficiency the reason is easy enough to see. Often the cost
of establishing the value of an initial entitlement by negotiation is so great that
even though a transfer of the entitlement would benefit all concerned, such a
transfer will not occur. If a collective determination of the value were available
instead, the beneficial transfer would quickly come about.
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Lessig's Calabresian focus on remedy follows Coase 21 and mirrors
the Bankruptcy Code' in assuming that the shape and allocation
of the underlying substantive entitlements are irrelevant-or at
least comfortably exogenous.30 Lessig argues that an efficient
allocation of the bundle of sticks can be reached, one way or
another, by private negotiation, either pre- or post-deprivation. A
market transaction, however, is not always an efficient device for
allocating entitlements, and negotiations are not costless. Mass
market consumer contracts raise complex issues of adhesion,
cognition, information asymmetry, and coordination.3 ' E-commerce
transactions involving personal information fall squarely within
this class of problematic transactions. Where market imperfections
are the norm, one cannot rely on private negotiations or markets to
generate the appropriate terms or substantive norms for data
sharing relationships. 2 Although a website customer may "consent"
in some vague way to disclose personal information, it is unrealistic
to expect such a transaction to carry with it a full comprehension of
the ways the website owner might use such data. In consumer
contracts, those legal obligations which are not mandated by law

28. Ronald M. Coase, The Problemof Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-15 (1960) (arguing

that in a world free of transaction costs, original entitlement questions are not relevant to
the question of how assets are deployed because they will end up in the hands of the highestvalue user). Unlike many of his followers, it is not clear that Coase himself believes that
these assumptions mirror reality. See infra note 162.
29. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48,54 (1979) (stating "Congress has generally
left the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate to state law").
30. See LESSIG, supra note 7, at 7-8, 63-100.

31. See Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers and Binding Commitment, 75 IND.
L.J. 1125, 1148-49 (2000). Professor Radin explains:
Market-emergent schemes of uniform contracts, on the other hand, have to
some courts and commentators looked like a property scheme imposed by

private companies for their own interests instead of by the government for the
interest of all. In other words, in public choice rhetoric, the traditional view has
been that legislative enactment is presumptively efficiency-enhancing, and

market emergence is presumptively rent-seeking. Because market-emergent
sets of terms are dictated by one party rather than arrived at by negotiation
between the parties, they have been dubbed contracts of adhesion, or take-it-orleave-it contracts.
Id. See generally Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96

HARv. L. REV. 1173 (1983) (arguing that contracts of adhesion should be presumed to be
unenforceable).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 176-80.
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are formed by adhesion or default."3 These obligations therefore will
be defined by legislatures,3 ' courts, or if shrink-wrap licenses are to
be enforced, by the seller/licensor.3 5
Thus, Lessig's focus on remedy, or the "status" of the entitlement,
and on bargaining as the method for defining and allocating entitlements ignores the inadequacy of bargaining in the privacy
36
context. It is necessary to describe an alternative mechanism
for generating substantive rules to govern personal information
transactions, and more importantly, to identify the appropriate
institutional source for those substantive rules and the appropriate
locus of enforcement.
"Right"divorced from "remedy." In an earlier article, I sought to
show that muddy and crystalline rules are the gatekeepers of institutional choice. 7 In our legal system, the interaction among courts,
legislatures, and the market depends on how substantive entitlements are structured.3 8 Whether entitlements will be generated or
33. See Rakoff, supra note 31, at 1183-96.
34. Where defaults are set by government, they may be waivable or mandatory. For a
discussion of the role ofwaivable defaults in data privacy transactions, see Edward J. Janger
& Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-BlileyAct, Information Privacy, and the Limits of
Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219 (2002). Also note that consumer protection law consists
of a combination of sticky defaults and mandatory rules. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (2001); Stephen
J. Ware, Consumer ArbitrationAs Exceptional Consumer Law (With a ContractualistReply
to Carrington& Haagen),29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195,206-09 (1998) (describing the principal
types of mandatory consumer protection law). See generally MICHAEL M. GREENFIELD,
CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS (2d ed. 1991); DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON
CONSUMER LAW (1991).
35. Compare Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148-51 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding
that terms sent in computer shipping box were binding on buyer who failed to return the
computer within the thirty days stipulated by those terms), and ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,
86 F.3d 1447, 1448-53 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that terms inside a package of software bind
the customer who used the software after having had the opportunity to reject the terms by
returning the goods), with Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Techs., 939 F.2d 91,95-106
(3d Cir. 1991) (holding that a disclaimer on a software package did not become a term of
agreement between buyer and seller).
36. Possible bases include hypothetical consent (i.e., a majoritarian default), efficiency,
or fairness. The point here is that any attempt to ground the norms for sharing personal data
in e-commerce transactions in consent is doomed to incoherence and subject to abuse.
37. Edward J. Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: JudicialCompetence and
Statutory Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559 (2001).
38. See Rose, supra note 8,at 600. Competing views of the relative merits of"rules and
standards" are discussed in RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 42-61
(1990); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557
(1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
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defined by legislatures, courts, or the market is determined by the
choice between crystals and mud (or rules and standards).39 A
crystalline rule places all of the relevant rights firmly in the hand
of the entitlement holder or "owner." A muddier standard leaves the
right subject to challenge by a competing claimant. Crystalline
rules situate decision-making and norm-generating authority in
either the legislature or the market. Muddy rules lead to judgemade decisions and legal norms articulated by judges.4
Just as the property/liability literature ignores the choice between crystals and mud, however, the literature on the shape of
substantive entitlements ignores the choice of remedy. In short,
both literatures fail to systematically explore the interaction between substantive rights, which can be crystalline or muddy in
form, and remedies, which give a legal norm the status of either
property or liability. Although Lessig ignores substantive privacy
norms, 4 privacy scholars critical of Lessig like Marc Rotenberg and
Jessica Litman, have tended to focus on the privacy entitlement
without regard to the reality that liability-based entitlements go
unenforced in bankruptcy.42
Norm nonenforcement in bankruptcy. Finally, although both
bankruptcy scholars and law and economics scholars recognize that
insolvency dilutes the liability rules' ability to enforce legal norms,
there is no consensus about how to respond.' Law and economics
scholars tend to focus on property rights as a solution, whereas
bankruptcy scholars resist the creation of new property rights
because they interfere with bankruptcy law's collective norm of
REV. 1685, 1687-1712 (1976); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379

(1985).
39. As a matter of terminology, I use the terms "rules" and "crystals" as synonyms, and

"mud" and "standards" as synonyms. At times I will even use the terms "muddy standards,"
and "crystalline rules." From time to time, however, the demands of a particular sentence
will cause me to refer to a "muddy rule," or to refer to a choice between "crystalline and
muddy rules." This is not intended as an oxymoron. In that construction, I am merely using

the word "rule" in its generic sense, to refer to an enforceable legal norm, regardless of its
form.
40. See Janger, supra note 37, at 581-82.
41. See LESSIG, supra note 7.
42. Compare Reidenberg,supra note 11, at504-06, Rotenberg, supra note 11, at 119-38,
and Schwartz, supra note 11, at 574-82, with LESSIG, supra note 7, at 142-63.
43. Privacy scholars appear to have missed this point entirely. See infra text

accompanying note 196.
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equal distribution and maximization of value through reorganization."' Again, the incoherence of the debate turns on the
failure to focus on the substance of5the norm in question and the
institution which will articulate it.'
"Muddy property," norm articulation,and norm enforcement--a
synthesis. The "muddy property" mechanism that I propose draws
on the law and economics literature of property and liability rules
and the literature of rules and standards, and suggests a synthesis.
As I have discussed in my earlier work, muddy standards force
parties ex ante to recognize that they might have to justify their
contractual terms and negotiating behavior ex post.46 This attribute
of muddy rules operates to enforce behavioral norms in ways that
crystalline rules do not.4'7 Efforts to resolve norm-based disputes
force disclosure of information related to the norm. This normbased information-forcing effect has both public and private implications. Muddy rules may improve the contracting behavior of
parties, but muddy rules also serve a more public purpose: they
force information about transactions into the legal system.' They
allow judges to develop rules incrementally through common law
reasoning, and inform legislative decision making by placing disputes on the record. 49 But muddiness alone is not enough. The
benefits of the muddy liability rule may evaporate entirely when a
debtor goes bankrupt. These behavior-regulating and informationforcing effects of muddy rules are maximized only when the muddy
rule is given the status of property.

44. Compare LoPucki, supra note 10, at 25-26, and Lynn M. LoPucki, The Irrefutable

Logic of JudgmentProofing:A Reply to ProfessorSchwarcz, 52 STAN. L. REV. 55,55-67 (1999)
[hereinafter LoPucki, Reply to Schwarcz], with Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of
Contract:ABankruptcy Paradigm,77 TEX. L. REV. 515,576-84 (1999) [hereinafter Schwarcz,
Freedom ofContract], Steven L. Schwarcz, The InherentIrrationalityofJudgment Proofing,

52 STAN. L. REv. 1, 5-10, 51-53 (1999) (hereinafter Schwarcz, JudgmentProofing],and Steven
L. Schwarcz, JudgmentProofing:ARejoinder, 52 STAN. L. REV. 77,77-85 (1999) [hereinafter
Schwarcz, Rejoinder].
45. To a large extent, the impasse arises because the norm at issue in the securitization

debate, repaying prepetition creditors, conflicts directly with a bankruptcy norm (equality
of distribution). In this Article, I focus on privacy, a nonbankruptcy norm, and this results
in a more productive conversation.

46. Janger, supra note 37 at 585; Rose, supra note 8, at 600.
47. See Janger, supra note 37, at 585.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 209-11.
49. See Janger, supra note 37, at 585-86.
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This Article proceeds in four steps. First, I use the strong contractual privacy policy offered by Yachoo and Toysmart to describe
current bankruptcy law, and demonstrate that the treatment of
personal information in bankruptcy turns on whether privacy
promises create a "claim," subject to discharge in bankruptcy,5' or
an "encumbrance" on personal information that survives the
bankruptcy discharge. 5 ' I then seek to show that the distinction
between property and liability does not work well for characterizing privacy policies. Second, I show that cognitive problems,
coordination problems, and information asymmetries have prevented the development of a functioning market for privacy policies
and practices. The Toysmart privacy policy is not the norm. Most
website privacy policies detail the manner in which information will
be used, not the ways in which it will be protected. In this second
Section, I also show that shifting from liability to property will not
solve the problem. Policymakers must pay more attention to
defining the underlying substantive privacy entitlement and, more
importantly, to the institutional process for formulating that entitlement.52 Third, I attempt to develop a theory of the informationforcing effect of muddy rules. I argue that muddy standards,
and muddy property rules in particular, have the effect of forcing
out norm-related information. Further, I suggest that such normrelated information-forcing is necessary if we are to articulate
appropriate rules for dealing with consumer privacy promises in
bankruptcy. Finally, in the fourth Section, I evaluate the Leahy
Amendment to the Bankruptcy Reform Bill in light of this
discussion.53 I argue that on the one hand, the Leahy Amendment
50. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2000).
51. Id. § 506.
52. One notable exception is Richard Craswell, whose excellent article, Property Rules
and Liability Rules in UnconscionabilityAnd Related Doctrines, explores the interaction

between substantive rules of contract intended to police consent and remedial choice. Richard
Craswell, PropertyRules andLiability Rules in Unconscionabilityand Related Doctrines,60

U. CHi. L. REV. 1 (1993); see also John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of
Uncertaintyon Compliancewith Legal Standards,70 VA. L. REV. 965,968-69 (1984) (arguing
that uncertainty in the legal process does not force defendants to choose between two
extremes of liability, but rather that there is a spectrum of choice that will result in different
degrees of liability). Even Craswell, however, has not tried to think through the effect that
choice of remedies can have on articulation of noncontractual norms, and how the presence
of uncertainty on the norm side affects the choice of remedy.
53. See supra note 6 (discussing the status of the Bankruptcy Reform Bill).
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points the way (imperfectly and incompletely) toward a more
nuanced understanding of the interaction between right and
remedy by creating a "muddy property rule." On the other hand, I
conclude that the Leahy Amendment ultimately fails, both because
it defers excessively to the market, and because it represents a
complete abdication by the legislature of its obligation to give some
shape to the privacy norms it ostensibly seeks to protect. I then
propose an alternative approach which links the concept of muddy
property to the emerging law of fair information practices (FIPs).

I. BANKRUPTCY LAW, BANKRUPTCY LAWLESSNESS
In the information privacy context the Toysmart case highlights
an aspect of bankruptcy law and insolvency that periodically
outrages the public, continually puzzles bankruptcy scholars, and
feeds armies of bankruptcy lawyers. Bankruptcy law is sometimes
perceived by debtors and nondebtors alike as a device for running
away from contractual obligation. Burger King franchises have
sought to get out from under their franchise agreements.5 4 Rock
stars have sought to renegotiate their contracts with record
companies.55 Now websites seek to sell customer lists out from
under privacy policies.
Bankruptcy judges and bankruptcy scholars have long attempted
to untangle this web. They recognize that some rights need to be
enforced, notwithstanding the debtor's insolvency, whereas other
rights can be modified for the benefits of creditors. Jay Westbrook,
in his extraordinary article, A Functional Analysis of Executory
Contracts,56 demonstrates that regardless of what a right is called,
54. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rovine Corp. (In re Rovine Corp.), 5 B.R. 402, 404
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1980).
55. See, e.g., In re James Taylor (James Taylor), 913 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1990); In re
Watkins, 210 B.R. 394 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1997) (TLC); All Blacks B.V. v. Gruntruck, 199 B.R.
970, 971-72 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1996); In re Noonan, 17 B.R. 793 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(Willie Nile); A. Mechelle Dickerson, Lifestyles of the Not-So-Rich or Famous: The Role of
Choice and Sacrificein Bankruptcy, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 629 (1997); David C. Norrell, Note, The
Strong Getting Stronger: Record Labels Benefit from Proposed Changes to the Bankruptcy
Code, 19 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 445 (1999); see also Todd M. Murphy, Note, Crossroads:
Modern ContractDissatisfactionas Applied to Songwritersand RecordingAgreements, 35 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 795 (2002); cf In re Carrere, 64 B.R. 156 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986)
(recounting bankruptcy suit of actress Tia Carrere).
56. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A FunctionalAnalysis ofExecutory Contracts,74 MINN. L.
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the demarcation between enforcement and nonenforcement largely
falls along the line between rights protected by a civil damage
remedy (liability), and rights that are enforceable by affirmative
judicial order or criminal sanction (property), what Westbrook calls
an "Interest in the Thing Itself" or "ITI."57 If the nondebtor has a
liability-based claim, it can be discharged in bankruptcy. If the
nondebtor holds a property right that can be enforced against third
parties, it must be respected in bankruptcy. There is a problem with
this division, however, and it is one that Westbrook himself
recognizes. Nonbankruptcy entitlements are not generally created
or defined with the property/liability distinction in mind.5" As a
result, enforcement of nonbankruptcy norms in bankruptcy becomes
haphazard at best.
Privacy policies prove to be a productive setting for thinking
about this larger bankruptcy problem. First, although privacy
policies are principally creatures of contract, 9 there are nascent
elements of property that pervade the relationship. As such, one
can articulate plausible lawyers' arguments for property-based
treatment, and can explore the implications of the competing
"contract" and "property" characterizations. Second, because
privacy policies are a product of the new and emerging law of
cyberspace, the underlying behavioral norms, transactional risks,
and public policy concerns are not fully understood. This facilitates
exploration of how the form and status of an entitlement interact
when a debtor is insolvent. To anticipate somewhat, I seek to show
that unless privacy norms are protected with a property rule, they
will go unenforced in bankruptcy, and because most privacy policies
are not as hard-edged as Toysmart's, a muddy entitlement will
encourage public and private dialogue about the privacy norms that
should govern consumer data transactions.
In this Section, I use Yachoo's rather unusual privacy policy as
a frame for describing various possible treatments of privacy
promises in bankruptcy, and to highlight the consequences of
REv. 227, 257-63 (1989).
57. Id. at 246.
58. Id. at 270 ("The analysis becomes complex in these cases when nonbankruptcy law
is unclear about the Other Party's right to [an Interest in the Thing Itself or "ITI"].").
59. In the absence of a contract, privacy rights lie in tort. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis
D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 210-11 (1890).
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characterizing privacy policies as property or contract. In the next
sections, I seek to disentangle uncertainty about the status of
entitlements (property/liability) from uncertainty about the shape
of the entitlements (crystals/mud). I argue first that little is gained
from uncertainty about status, but that a muddy formulation of the
substantive norm at stake can have important benefits. Second, I
argue that the choice between crystals and mud should be made in
conjunction with the property/liability decision, with instincts about
comparative institutional competence at the fore.
A. Privacy Promises in the Real World
As noted above, the answer to Headcold's question about Yachoo's
privacy policy begins with Toysmart.6 ° Toysmart was a dot-coin,
started with the backing of the Walt Disney Corporation, that
sought to sell educational toys to children and their parents over
the World Wide Web. In the process of selling toys, Toysmart
gathered information both about adults and about children."' To
encourage a feeling of comfort in their customers, Toysmart posted
a privacy policy on their website that, like Yachoo's policy, stated
they would "never" sell nonpublic, personally-identifiable information about customers to third parties. This privacy policy was
unusual. Many dot-coins view selling data as part of their business
model, and therefore post privacy policies that leave much more
room for sale of personal information. Notwithstanding this
unusually restrictive privacy policy, when Toysmart's liquidation
consultant, The Recovery Group, advertised the sale of various
62
Toysmart assets, they included the company's customer list.
60. See In re Toysmart.com, LLC, No. 00-13995-CJK (Bankr. D. Mass. filed June 9,2000).
61. They ran a "dinosaur trivia contest" through which they gathered information about
children who visited the site. Complaint, FTC v. Toysmart, LLC, No. 00-11341-RGS (Mass.
Dist. Ct. filed July 10, 2000), availableat http:I/www.techlawjournal.com/courts/toysmartt
20000710.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2003) (detailing Toysmart's information-gathering
practices).
62. Jane Kaufman Winn & James R. Wrathall, Who Owns The Customer?The Emerging
Law of CommercialTransactionsin ElectronicCustomerData,56 BUS. LAW. 213,227 (2000).
Toysmart.com had retained the services of The Recovery Group, a Boston
management consultant, in an effort to frnd buyers for its assets. A Wall Street
Journal advertisement for Toysmart.com's asset sale listed, among other
things: "Intangibles, i.e., URL name, databases, customer lists, marketing
plans, web site content, land] software intellectual property."
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Prior to filing for bankruptcy, Toysmart had entered into a
contract with Trust-e. 8 Trust-e is a so-called "privacy seal
service"-a nonprofit organization that provides privacy auditing
services.14 Trust-e's contract provided that Toysmart.com could
display the Trust-e logo on its website, but only if they complied
with certain guidelines, and only if Toysmart complied with its own
published privacy policy. Toysmart's decision to sell its customer
list in violation of its privacy policy put Trust-e's credibility and,
indeed its entire franchise, on the line. If websites using the Trust-e
logo could file for bankruptcy and then turn around and sell
personal information with impunity, Trust-e certification would be
worthless. Trust-e brought Toysmart's proposed sale to the
attention of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The FTC sued
Toysmart in the Federal District Court for the District of
Massachusetts, and the sale was temporarily stopped.65 Toysmart
then negotiated a settlement with the FTC, under which Toysmart
agreed that it would only sell the information to a company that
would provide appropriate protection, and which would make use
of the information in a manner similar to that of Toysmart.66 The
bankruptcy judge rejected the settlement as premature, because
Id. The Toysmart case was widely reported at the time. See Matt Richtel, Toysmart.com in
Settlement with F. T. C.; Deal Would Allow Sale of CustomerDatabase,N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
2000, at Cl; see also Laura Lorek, When Toysmart Broke, INTERACTIVE WK. FROM ZDWIRE,
Aug. 7, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4067740.
63. See http://www.Truste.com.
64. Trust-e has been described as a sort of Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval for the
Web. More than 2000 sites have been certified by Trust-e as having met certain criteria for
safeguarding customer privacy. See Greg Sandoval, FailedDot-Coms May Be Selling Your
PrivateInformation,CNET NEWS.COM, June 29,2000, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1007200-2176430.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2003).
65. Complaint, FTC v. Toysmart.com, LLC, No. 00-11341-RGS (Mass. Dist. Court filed
July 10, 2000), availableat http://www.techlawjournal.con/courts/toysmart/20000710.htm
(last visited Feb. 25, 2003). Because some of that customer data had been collected from
children through a "dinosaur trivia contest" without parental consent or notification, the
complaint also charged that Toysmart.com had violated the Children's Online Privacy
Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6503 (2000) and 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.3-312.5 (2002). Id.
66. See Toysmart Stipulation, supra note 4; see also Press Release, FTC Announces
Settlement with Bankrupt Website, Toysmart.com, Regarding Alleged Privacy Policy
Violations (July 21, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/07/toysmart2.htm (last
visited Feb. 25, 2003); Stephanie Stoughton, Toysmart Offer Hit By Advocates: Say Disney
Bid to Buy, Retire Customer List Doesn't Ensure Privacy,THE BOSTON GLOBE, July 14,2000,
at Cl; Toysmart.com Settles Case About Sale of Users"Data, THE DESERET NEWS, July 22,
2000, at B06.
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no buyer was waiting in the wings.67 The end result of the case
was that Disney, possibly as a public relations move, agreed to
pay $50,000 to the Toysmart estate to destroy the data. 8
Notwithstanding Toysmart's initial optimism about using
bankruptcy law to help realize the value of the customer lists, the
attempt failed.
Outside of bankruptcy, personal data sales have been in the news
as well. In the fall of 2000, hoping to preserve its ability to sell
customer data in the wake of Toysmart, Amazon.com changed its
privacy policy and expressly notified its customers that it would sell
customer data from time to time as part of its business.9 More
recently, e-Tour.com, an Internet portal with a privacy policy
similar to Toysmart's, sold all of its assets to Ask-Jeeves.com,
including customer lists, outside of bankruptcy. The Electronic
Privacy Information Center filed a complaint with the FTC, and
that story continues to unfold.7"
A curious aspect of the Toysmart story, however, is that it was
not bankruptcy law or contract law per se that chilled the sale of
customer information. It was nonbankruptcy state and federal law,
a government agency, and a bankruptcy judge all working together
that led to the Toysmart result. Indeed, the Bankruptcy Code had
virtually nothing to do with the result. Moreover, privacy policies
like Toysmart's (and Yachoo's) are increasingly unusual. As noted
above, websites now tend to use privacy policies as a means to
justify disclosure, rather than as a guaranty of privacy protection.
To understand how to deal with future cases, it is necessary to
pull apart these layers. Both inside and outside of bankruptcy, the
legal framework for dealing with transactions in personal data is up
67. Top Stories, Privacy: Bankruptcy Judge Rejects FTC Settlement Under New Child
PrivacyLaw: FTC v. Toysmart.com, 11 ANDREWS E-BUS. L. BULL. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Top
Stories).
68. Thirty-eight state attorneys general, who had objected to the sale along with the FTC,
also agreed to this disposition. National Association of Attorneys General, Thirty-eight
Attorneys General Reach Agreement With Toysmart, NAAG CONSUMER PROTECTION REP.,
Jan. 2001, at 4.
69. Tamara Loomis, Amazon Revamps Its Policy on SharingData, 224 N.Y. L.J. 5 (2000)
(noting changes in Amazon.com's privacy policy in response to the Toysmart case).
70. See Letter from Marc Rotenberg and Andrew Shen to National Association of
Attorneys General and Federal Trade Commission (May 25, 2001), available at
httpdAvww.epic.org/privacy/internet/etour.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2002).
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for grabs. The status of privacy policies, and the limits on sale
notwithstanding the absence of a privacy policy, are both uncertain."
B. The Law: Outside of Bankruptcy
For the most part, a debtor's rights and obligations in bankruptcy
are determined by applicable nonbankruptcy law. 7 ' Answering
Headcold's question about what happens to Yachoo's privacy policy
in bankruptcy requires, as a threshold matter, an analysis of
Headcold's question outside of bankruptcy. Until recently, and in
the absence of the privacy policy, the answer would have been
simple. Except to the extent that it might have been governed by
medical privacy rules, Yachoo could have sold customer information
at will.73 As sensitivity about web-based businesses' ability to collect

information about customers has increased, and as technology has
allowed businesses to aggregate customer data in new ways, 74 there
has been a growing layer of regulation governing the gathering and
dissemination of customer data. For example, the Gramm-Leach71. Recent discussions of this issue include Stephen F. Ambrose, Jr. & Joseph W. Gelb,
ConsumerPrivacyRegulation and Litigation,56 Bus. LAW. 1157 (2001); Jane Kaufman Winn
& James R. Wrathall, Who Owns the Customer? The Emerging Law of Commercial
Transactionsin ElectronicCustomerData, 56 BUS. LAW. 213 (2000); Andrew B. Buxbaum &
Louis A. Curcio, Note, When You Can't Sell to Your Customers, Try Selling Your Customers
(ButNot UnderThe Bankruptcy Code), 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 395 (2000); see also Steven
A. Hetcher, The Emergence of Website Privacy Norms, 7 MICH. TELECoMM. & TECH. L. REV.
97 (2001), available at http://www.mttlr.org/volseven/hetcher.html (last visited Feb. 25,
2003).

72. See Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979) ("Congress has generally left the
determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate to state law.").
73. Before the advent ofthe World Wide Web, companies freely bought and sold customer
lists and customer information. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479,
487 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991) (rejecting individual's claim of property
right in his genetic information)); Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1131 n.31 (2000) (citing Polin v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 768 F.2d 1204,
1207 (10th Cir. 1985) (rejecting privacy claim based on unauthorized release of credit report
information)).
74. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTINGOFFIcE, SOCiALSECURITY: GOVERNMENTANDCOMMERCIAL
USE OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER IS WIDESPREAD 7-12 (1999); see also Daniel J. Solove,
DigitalDossiersand the DissipationofFourthAmendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083
(2002) ("[T]here is increasingly a detailed series of records being created about almost every
facet of a person's life, and these records can be easily stored, transferred, combined, and
searched.").
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Bliley Amendments to the Glass-Steagal Act7" contain a number of
provisions governing the disclosure of personal information by
financial institutions,7" the Video Privacy Protection Act," and the
European Union has promulgated a directive which governs
international transfers of personal information from companies in
the E.U. to companies in the United States.78 All of these regimes,
however, are more lenient than the highly restrictive, and
somewhat unusual, policy that Yachoo imposed upon itself.79 As
such, the initial focus is on the constraint imposed by Yachoo's own
privacy policy, which raises three issues: (1) is there an enforceable
contract?, (2) what are the consequences of breach?, and (3) is the
contract enforceable by specific performance?
The answers, outside of bankruptcy, are reasonably straightforward. Privacy policies are likely to be enforceable.8 0 Even outside
75. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). For a
discussion of the various statutes governing dissemination of customer data, see Janger,
supra note 23. See also PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW
(1996); PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW SUPPLEMENT (1998).

76. These protections are found in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act's Title V. For a more
detailed discussion of these provisions, see Janger & Schwartz, supra note 34.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994).
78. PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLOWS,
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE (1998); Paul M. Schwartz,

European Data Protection Law and Restrictionson InternationalData Flows, 80 IOWA L.
REV. 471 (1995); Spiros Simitis, From the Market to the Polis: The EU Directive on the
Protection of Personal Data, 80 IOWA L. REV. 445, 463-66 (1995). The requirements for
complying with the "Safe Harbor" negotiated between the European Union and the United
States can be found at httpJ/www.export.gov/safeharbor/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2003).
79. It is important to recognize that the Yachoo/Toysmart/e-Tours hard-line privacy
policy is not the only form that such policies take. "Hard" privacy policies, however, are not
unknown, and they allow us to focus the analysis on the contract issues and their treatment
in bankruptcy. This focus is essential if the goal of the enterprise is to create a legal regime
where privacy issues will be resolved by private negotiation, and ifone is to evaluate whether
such a regime is feasible. See Janger & Schwartz, supra note 34.
80. Some website owners may argue that their privacy policies are not enforceable
because they lack consideration. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1979) ("To
constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained for."); Walter
W. Miller, Jr. & Maureen A. O'Rourke, BankruptcyLaw v. Privacy Rights: Which Holds the
Trump Card?,38 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 795 (2001). Courts will likely look past this argument,
finding either that the exchange of information for a privacy promise constitutes sufficient
consideration to make the contract enforceable, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 81 (1979) ("The fact that what is bargained for does not of itself induce the making of a
promise does not prevent it from being consideration for the promise."), or that the website
customer relied on the existence of a privacy policy in giving the information, even if they
didn't read the policy itself. See id. § 90.
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of bankruptcy, however, the limitations of a regime based on
contractual liability become apparent. A damages-based regime is
likely to undercompensate website customers, and underdeter
data sales that violate privacy policies. The harm caused by
nonconsensual data sales is largely dignitary, and the financial
harm is both small and difficult to quantify.8 ' Only in the aggregate
are damages likely to be significant, and there are significant
obstacles to any lawsuit that might aggregate such claims.8 2 In
short, some deterrence is likely, but the amount is not likely to be
optimal.
Outside of bankruptcy, the contract might also be enforceable by
specific performance. While courts generally favor compensatory
damages as a remedy for contractual breach, in limited circumstances courts will compel performance of a contract by issuing
an order of specific performance."8 Specific performance is only
81. Contract damages are compensatory in nature, and the consequences of breach are
hard to determine in data privacy cases. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1979)

("Judicial remedies [for breach ofcontract] serve to protect ... his 'expectation interest,' which
is his interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he
would have been in had the contract been performed ....'). While damages will turn on the
nature of the information disclosed, in many cases, the information subject to the promise
is of relatively little value insofar as it applies to a single person. It may just be the fact that
the customer bought a certain type of shirt in a certain color and size from L.L. Bean. In the
case of Yachoo, however, the information may be more sensitive (such as ordering a herbal
remedy for bad breath). For a site like Yachoo, the harm is likely to be correspondingly
greater, but it is still likely to be dignitary rather than monetary. Even for Yachoo, to the
extent that a customer seeks compensation for loss suffered as a result of disclosure, the
monetary damages will be relatively small. In the absence of a statute allowing for statutory
or punitive damages, or a separate tort cause of action, the financial incentives associated
with a liability regime are likely to understate the actual harm caused by a sale of data. See
Stern v. Delphi Internet Services Corp., 626 N.Y.S.2d. 694 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (detailing an
unsuccessful attempt to use misappropriation theory to sue electronic bulletin board); DAN
B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1198-1200 (2000).

82. The fact that each individual has such a small interest, and suffers such a small
harm, creates a collective action problem that reduces the expected cost of any liability. The
availability of class action procedures may help remedy this collective action problem. See
Supnick v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2000 WL 1603820 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (certifying class action
against Amazon.com for violation of privacy policy in connection with Alexa software). Still,
the risk of contract damages, though significant, will not reflect the full damage caused by
such a transfer, and may not be sufficiently large to chill a data sale, and some courts have
been hostile to class actions in cases where large databases are at issue. See, e.g., In re Trans
Union Corp. Privacy Litigation, 2002 WL 31028234, at *8-9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2002) (holding
class actions are not available under the Fair Credit Reporting Act).
83. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 345 (1979) ("The judicial remedies available

for the protection of the interests stated in § 344 include a judgment or order ... requiring
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available when contract damages are inadequate.84 Although it is
likely that a court will conclude that they are inadequate, the court
must still "balance the equities," and decide whether the harm to
the plaintiff outweighs the benefit to Yachoo."5 It is hard to
generalize in this instance. Courts are likely to be sensitive to the
fact that the information compilation may be worth a lot to the
company, and the harm of disclosure may be minimal.86 Courts are
also likely to weigh the promise not to disclose heavily, and to
consider techniques for ameliorating the harm of the disclosure
(such as providing a requirement to opt-in or an opportunity to optout).
Outside of bankruptcy, if a privacy policy is enforced with a
liability rule, there is a significant risk of underdeterrence because
of the principally dignitary nature of the harm, but the liability rule
provides some protection because of the threat of liability in the
aggregate. If rights under Yachoo's privacy policy are characterized
as property-based, these rights receive significantly more protection. The providers of personal information (Yachoo's customers)
will be able to veto any transfer of the information.87 Indeed,
outside of bankruptcy, it may be virtually impossible to obtain the
consents necessary to permit a sale.88
Thus, whether Yachoo can sell the information will turn largely on whether the promise is deemed to be specifically enforceable
-whether privacy policies are enforced by a liability rule or a
property rule.

specific performance of a contract or enjoining its non-performance .... ).
84. Id. § 359 ("Specific performance ...
will not be ordered if damages would be adequate
to protect the expectation interest of the injured party.").
85. Id. The official comment to § 359 of the Restatement goes on to state: "Adequacy is
to some extent relative, and the modern approach is to compare remedies to determine which
is more effective in serving the ends of justice." Id. § 359 cmt. a.
86. Complaint, Judnick v. DoubleClick, Inc., No. CV.000421 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
2000) (alleging state law claims for placing cookies and creating personally identifiable
profiles in violation of stated privacy policy).
87. However, specific performance is only available if suit is brought before the
information is disclosed. Once the data is sold/disclosed, it cannot be unsold. In that case,
again, the sole remedy would be damages. Only if personal information is granted property
status could the limitation on use be extended to subsequent transferees.
88. For large databases, the cost of gathering consents may swamp the benefit.
See Heller, supra note 23, at 624; see also Janger, supra note 23.
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C. Privacy Promises in Bankruptcy
While the distinction between property and liability makes a big
difference to Yachoo outside of bankruptcy, this distinction between
treatment of privacy promises as liability-based or property-based
becomes paramount if Yachoo files for bankruptcy. If privacy
promises are protected by civil damages, the privacy policy will
provide no (or almost no) constraint on the sale of the information.
By contrast, if the promise is treated as an encumbrance on the
information enforceable in bankruptcy (i.e., "property"), bankruptcy
court supervision of the debtor's assets will enhance the effect of
property-based protection. No disclosure will be permitted without
bankruptcy court approval, and there is no mechanism in place
for obtaining such approval. 9 The result will be to frustrate asset
sales.
1. Liability Rules-Executory Contractsand Unsecured Claims
in Bankruptcy
It is a commonplace of bankruptcy law that liability claims are
discharged," and property rights are respected.9 ' To understand
the treatment of contracts in bankruptcy it is necessary to
understand the distinction between "assets," "prepetition claims,"
and "executory contracts" in bankruptcy.92 In a classic pair of
articles, Vern Countryman demonstrated that a debtor's contractual obligations can be divided into four categories based on
whether the parties' obligations are fully performed or remain
89. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2000). The power to sell assets free and clear of liens is sometimes
viewed as a mechanism for sweeping away encumbrances. However, as discussed below,
without at least some statutory tweaking, it will not work well for privacy promises.
90. Id. § 524.
91. Id. §§ 361, 506; see also Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992).
92. This is not a trivial undertaking.
Bankruptcy is that volume of the law that might have been written by Lewis
Carroll ....
In no chapter of that volume has the law become more psychedelic
than in the one titled 'executory contracts.' The courts increasingly voice cries
of confusion and frustration over the treatment of contracts in bankruptcy.
Westbrook, supra note 56, at 228; see also Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy: Understanding"Rejection,"59 U. COLO.L. REV. 845 (1988) [hereinafter Andrew,
Executory Contracts];Michael T. Andrew, Executory ContractsRevisited:A Reply to Professor
Westbrook, 62 U. COLO.L. REV. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Andrew, Reply to Westbrook].
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executory.9" A slightly modified version of Countryman's chart
follows:
"Countryman Test" for Characterizing
Contract Obligations
Nondebtor's
Obligation
Performed

Nondebtor's
Obligation
Executory

Debtor's
Obligation
Performed

Fully Executed
Contract

Asset of the Debtor

Debtor's
Obligation

Claim against the
Debtor

Executory Contract

Executory

If the contract is fully performed on both sides, the contract is fully
executed, and there is nothing for the law to do. Similarly, if the
debtor has fully performed, the nondebtor simply owes an obligation
to the debtor that can be enforced inside or outside of bankruptcy by
the trustee or debtor-in-possession.94 The contract right is an asset
of the estate.9"
93. Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part1, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439
(1973) [hereinafter Countryman, Part 11; Ven Countryman, Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy: Part11, 58 MINN. L. REv. 479 (1974) [hereinafter Countryman, Part III.
94. Section 541(a) vests in the bankruptcy estate all of the debtor's "legal and equitable
interest in property." 11 U.S.C. § 541. This includes the debtor's right to insist on
performance of the contract. To make this clear, § 541(c) overrides nonassignment clauses
that would otherwise prevent the transfer of such contractual rights to the estate. Id. §
541(c).
95. Both Westbrook and the National Bankruptcy Review Commission have noted that
courts have been mystified by the significance of a determination that a contract is not
"executory." Many courts have adopted the "functional approach" proposed by Westbrook in
the article discussed in the text. Under the functional approach nothing turns on the
determination of executoriness, except preserving for the debtor time postpetition to
determine whether to perform. The National Bankruptcy Review Commission recommended
doing away with the "executoriness" requirement entirely. NAT'L BANKR. REV. COMM'N,
BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS, FINAL REPORT 454 (1997) [hereinafter COMMISSION

REPORT]; see also Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Commission'sRecommendations Concerning
The Treatment of Bankruptcy Contracts,5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 463 (1997).
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The legally complex categories are those where there is some
obligation of the debtor (such as a privacy promise) that remains to
be performed at the time of bankruptcy. Here, as with any claim
against the debtor, whether for payment or performance, the nondebtor runs up against the debtor's insolvency, and bankruptcy's socalled "equality principal," which can be summed up as "similarly
situated creditors should be treated equally."9 6 As Westbrook put it:
The first concrete consequence of the equality principle is that
the trustee can breach (reject) a contract profitably far more
often than can other contract parties because the trustee pays
only a fraction of contract damages rather than the full amount
of the Other Party's breach loss. From that simple proposition
flows most of the economic "magic" associated with bankruptcy
contract doctrine.9 7
If the nondebtor has fully performed, as with a loan contract, or
in most cases with a privacy promise, the obligation is treated as
an unsecured prepetition claim under § 502 of the Code.9" The
consequence of being treated as an unsecured claim is that the value
of the claim is paid out of the unencumbered assets of the estate, 99
if any exist, and then discharged." Typically unsecured claimants
receive only cents on the dollar. If claims for violation of Yachoo's
privacy policy are treated as dischargeable unsecured claims,
Yachoo's customers will be forced to rely on their pro-rata share of
the unencumbered assets of the estate for their recovery.
If both the debtor and the nondebtor have obligations to perform,
the treatment is, on its face, somewhat more complicated, but in the
case of Yachoo's privacy promise, the outcome is the same.10' When
obligations remain on both sides, the contract is treated as an
"executory contract" under § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. Then the
96. 11 U.S.C. §§ 726, 1122(a), 1322(aX3).
97. Westbrook, supra note 56, at 246.
98. 11 U.S.C. § 502(g).
99. Id. § 502(a).
100. Id. § 524.
101. Andrew, Reply to Westbrook, supra note 92, at 8 (*But while unnecessary, rejection

is also harmless: It does not make the contract obligation somehow vanish, and its 'breach'
consequence does nothing more than create a claim. Thus, whether the contract is 'executory'

or not, the result is the same: The non-debtor party has a claim.").
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debtor is given the option to "assume" (perform) the contract, and
retain the benefit of the nondebtor's performance, or to "reject"
(breach) the'contract.0 2 If the contract is rejected, the claim that
arises from the breach is, again, treated as a prepetition unsecured
claim, notwithstanding that the breach may not have occurred until
after the debtor filed for bankruptcy.'0 3 The nondebtor will receive
payment in cents on the dollar.
These latter two categories (claim and executory contract) thus
provide a stark demonstration of bankruptcy's effect on privacy
policies if those policies are given liability-based protection. Breach
by Yachoo of its privacy policy will be treated as a dischargeable
claim. When the debtor's business fails, it may choose to sell
personal information in its possession, and pay the resulting claim
in bankruptcy dollars. To all outward appearance, bankruptcy gives
the debtor the power to simply walk away from its contractual
obligations. Westbrook notes, however, "[tihe key point here is that
it is the discharge that costs all of [the unsecured creditors], ... the

right to enforce their unsecured contract claims, not some exotic
bankruptcy rule about 'executory' contracts." 4 Indeed, it may not
be bankruptcy law at all that causes this problem. It is merely an
illustration of what law and economics scholars call the "judgment
proof' problem.' 5 Liability-based entitlements are not particularly
useful for enforcing duties against people or entities without assets.
Most of Yachoo's personal information will derive from one-time
transactions. A customer visits the Yachoo website, and in return
for the promise of confidentiality and the use of the website,
discloses certain information. The information then goes into
Yachoo's database, and the transaction is complete, except for the
debtor's continuing obligation to keep the information confidential,
and perhaps the debtor's continuing obligation to provide access to
the website. Because all of the future (executory) obligations (and
none of the benefits) under this contract run to the debtor, there is
no business incentive for the debtor to honor the contract, 10 6 and
102. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a).
103. Id. § 365(g).
104. Westbrook, supra note 56, at 277.
105. Shavell, supra note 10, at 56; see also LoPucki, supra note 10, at 1.
106. If the contract is executory, then this must be accomplished by rejection. If the

contract is nonexecutory, rejection is not necessary. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a). Westbrook argues

1830

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1801

because of the bankruptcy discount, the likely result is sale of data
to the highest bidder. Even in the unusual cases where the customer
still has obligations to perform and the contract is therefore
"executory," the outcome is no different. The consequences of the
debtor's decision not to perform will be treated as a prepetition
claim,1" 7 and the application of the bankruptcy discount to the
nonbankruptcy breach claim will create a strong incentive for the
debtor to breach its privacy promise and sell a nondebtor's personal
information.
In sum, if a privacy promise is treated solely as a promise, and
the customer's personal information has value if sold, there is an
overwhelming incentive for the debtor to breach the promise. On the
one hand, this will allow the debtor to maximize the value of its
assets. To the extent that the debtor's cache of personal information
is valuable, this regime allows the debtor to realize that value for
the benefit of its creditors. On the other hand, the liability-based
regime will also have the unfortunate effect of defeating customer
expectations.
This last harm is twofold. It affects the individual whose
information is disclosed, and it affects society, in the form of two
related "commons." First, there is what might be called the "ecommerce commons." The World Wide Web is still in the early
stages of developing into a global marketplace. To the extent that
consumer trust in e-commerce is depleted when companies fail and
in the process disclose personal information, the result may be
significant harm to cyberspace. Second, there is what might be
called the "privacy commons" which can be viewed as a necessary
precondition to democracy."0 The Web is not just a space where
forcefully that this distinction is meaningless:
[Executoriness] is a requirement with no basis in the Code. If bankruptcy contract problems can be fully understood without reference to that requirement,
it is surplusage and has no effect except confusion and obfuscation. No
bankruptcy policy is served by the requirement, and executoriness is not
necessary to the operation of the well understood basic rules about treatment
of bankruptcy contracts.
Westbrook, supra note 56 at 282. Under current law, however, the ritual of rejecting may be
necessary to ensure that a creditorwill not argue that the "breach" occurred postpetition, and
that they are entitled to an administrative claim under the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 503.
107. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g).
108. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A

CONNECTED WORLD (2001); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air To Common Use: First
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commerce happens. It is also a space where civil society exists,
where public speech and private conduct occur to the benefit of
society as a whole. Without appropriate protection of personal

information, this function of the Web (and this aspect of civil society)
may be sacrificed. 19
2. PropertyRules-Specific Performance,License Law, and
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy
Because of the bankruptcy discharge, a liability-based regime is

simple, but unprotective of privacy promises. By contrast, bankruptcy law seeks to leave property relatively undisturbed.1 A
property regime may therefore turn out to be more protective, if not
overprotective of privacy promises.
a. Secured Claims in Bankruptcy
If a creditor has an interest in the debtor's property that is
enforceable against the bankruptcy trustee, that creditor is treated
as a secured creditor under § 506 of the Bankruptcy Code." 1
Amendment Constraintson Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999).
109. For an excellent discussion of the "privacy commons," see Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy
and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1609, 1667 (1999) (hereinafter Schwartz,
Privacy in Cyberspace]("Privacy territories are also needed for personal data in cyberspace;
multi-dimensional privacy norms must draw on workable standards capable of creating
information preserves. Participants in cyberspace need access to public, quasi-public, and
private spaces where they can engage in civic dialogue and the process of self-definition.").
See also Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig's Code ForInternet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters,
Privacy-Control, And Fair Information Practices, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 743 [hereinafter
Schwartz, Lessig's Code]; Paul M. Schwartz, InternetPrivacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV.
815, 834 (2000) [hereinafter Schwartz, Privacyand the State] ('[Tihe current privacy regime
has a negative effect on the Internet's ability to contribute to democratic community in the
United States.").
110. The effect of a bankl-uptcy discharge is to enjoin enforcement of a debt, not to displace
property interests. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(dX1XA) ("Except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, in the plan, or in the order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan ...
discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation .... ").
Although the Trustee in Bankruptcy does have the power to avoid certain property interests,
that power is much more limited. Id. § 550.
111. Id. § 506. Although the debtor is entitled to use property of the estate during the
bankruptcy, id. § 363, and can sell non-cash collateral with court approval, id. §§ 363(e),(f),
the holder of the property right is entitled to have the value of that claim protected during
the course of the bankruptcy-except to the extent that the compensation is for the delay in
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Because privacy policies are promissory in nature, however, it is not
particularly easy to characterize privacy promises as embodying a
property interest. 112 The usual view of personal information is that
an individual has the absolute power not to disclose information, but
that once the information is disclosed, no property interest
remains."' Under current law, this is the likely result. However, to
the extent that more protection of data is desirable, some judges
might be willing to be creative, or Congress might pass legislation.
There are two theories that might work under current law, or which
might be adopted as a mechanism for propertization: (1) specific
performance, and (2) license.
b. Specific Performancein Bankruptcy
As noted above, there is a reasonable likelihood that outside
of bankruptcy, a court would find a privacy promise enforceable
by specific performance. Damages are likely to be inadequate:
the information is unique, and the harm is continuing. Outside of

foreclosure occasioned by the stay. United Say. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Assoc., 484 U.S. 365 (1988). As such, they may be entitled to adequate protection payments,
11 U.S.C. § 361, and may be able to obtain a lifting of the stay to foreclose. Id. §§ 362(d),
363(e). In short, the property right must be respected. It is somewhat difficult to give
meaning to these concepts when a privacy policy is involved. Adequate protection is usually
understood to protect the financial value of an asset, and the value of personal information
is not principally monetary. Moreover, if the property interest exists at all, it is a right
against disclosure (i.e., sale) of the information; it is difficult to conceive of a form of
"adequate protection" that would permit the sale.
112. Privacy scholars are grappling their way toward various conceptions of fair
information practices. As discussed in Part IV below, these fair information practices might
at some point provide a framework for "adequate protection" of a nondebtor's rights in
personal information, but that regime is not in place under current law. Moreover, this
regime is not likely to develop so long as privacy policies are treated as purely contractual
in nature.
113. This view of personal information turns on what Paul Schwartz described as the
"data seclusion deception." Schwartz, Privacy in Cyberspace, supra note 109, at 1663.
Schwartz writes:
The idea of privacy as data seclusion is easy to explain: unless the individual
wishes to surrender her personal information, she is to be free to use her
privacy right as a trump to keep it confidential or to subject its release to
conditions that she alone wishes to set. The individual is to be at the center of
shaping data anonymity. Yet, this right to keep data isolated quickly proves
illusory because of the demands of the Information Age.
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bankruptcy, a contract right that is enforceable by specific
performance crosses the line from contract to property right."" The
legal rights can be enforced by legal compulsion, not just damages.
The status of specifically enforceable promises in bankruptcy,
however, is less clear. Countryman stated the general principle that
115
specific performance cannot be enforced against the estate.
Specific performance, he explains, would have the effect of preferring the contract claimant above other unsecured creditors." 6
Although this is descriptively accurate and good policy, Countryman
never fully explains why this is true as a doctrinal matter. The
result was a series of highly controversial executory contract cases
that made it look as though § 365 conveyed an additional "avoiding"
power on the trustee."1
According to Westbrook, Countryman missed a step. The general
principle that specific performance is not available in bankruptcy,
though true as a descriptive matter, actually requires a two-step
analysis. Specific performance does create a property right under
state law. That property interest, however, may be subject to avoidance under one of the trustee's avoiding powers." 8 The tortured
reasoning in cases analyzing specific performance derives from a
failure to understand the difference between a contract right and a

114. See Westbrook, supra note 56, at 247.
115. See id. at 255; Countryman, PartI, supra note 93, at 465,471 n.121; see also Jay L.
Westbrook, The Coming Encounter:InternationalArbitrationand Bankruptcy, 67 MINN. L.
REv. 595, 623-24 (1983).
116. See Westbrook, supra note 56, at 255-56.
117. See, e.g., In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 34 B.R. 521 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983),
stay denied, 36 B.R. 270 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984), rev'd, 38 B.R. 341 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984),
rev'd sub nom. Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir.
1985), cert. denied sub nom. Lubrizol Enters. v. Canfield, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986); Burger King
Corp. v. Rovine Corp. (In re Rovine Corp.), 5 B.R. 402, 404 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1980), later
proceeding, 6 B.R. 661 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1980).
118. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544,545, 547, 548, 549, 550 (2000); see alsoAndrew, Reply to Westbrook,
supra note 92, at 17. Andrew explains:
Consistent with bankruptcy law's general deference to state-law rights in or to
specific property, rejection of a contract does not terminate such rights that
arise from rejected contracts. That is, rejection is not itself an avoiding power.
Rights in property that arise from a contract may, however, be terminated by
bankruptcy law's normal avoiding powers (citations omitted).
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property right in a specific asset, or as Westbrook calls it, an
"Interest in the Thing Itself' (ITI).' 9
The result was that courts tried to make § 365 do too much
work.12 Many contracts create rights against particular assets. As
noted above, when a seller agrees to sell a book, she creates an
entitlement in the buyer to that book. If the seller declines to deliver
the book as promised, state law may protect the buyer's rights with
a damage remedy (a liability rule), or, if the book is a unique first
edition, may enforce that contract by specific performance (a
property rule). To use Westbrook's terminology, if the buyer's right
is enforceable by specific performance, the buyer has an ITI.
This, however, does not end the inquiry. If there is an ITI, that
ITI cannot be avoided through rejection of the contract. The ITI may,
however, be subject to avoidance under one of the trustee's other
avoiding powers. 12 ' Most importantly, the transfer may be avoidable under the trustee's "strong-arm" power.'2 2 Under § 544 of the
Bankruptcy Code, the trustee can avoid any conveyance of property
that could have been avoided by a hypothetical lien creditor or
bona fide purchaser of real estate at the moment of bankruptcy.
For example, an unrecorded sale of land is enforceable by specific
performance and creates an ITI. An unrecorded sale of land,
however, can be avoided by a bona fide purchaser, and hence by the
bankruptcy trustee. The ITI is therefore unenforceable in bankruptcy and there is no right to specific performance. Similarly, when
personal property is involved, a purchaser who wishes to beat the
bankruptcy trustee must either take possession or record a UCC
financing statement with the Secretary of State.1 2 Therefore, an
executory contract to sell a particular book might be specifically

119. Westbrook, supra note 56, at 245-46 ("The most important and pervasive exception
to the equality principle throughout bankruptcy law is the enforcement of state-law interests

in specific assets of the estate, what may loosely be called a 'property right' and what I call
an 'Interest in the Thing Itself (ITI).").
120. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 117.
121. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2000) (strong arm), id. § 545 (statutory liens), id. § 547 (preferences),
id. § 548 (fraudulent conveyances), id. § 549 (post petition transfers), id.§ 550 (avoided
transfers).
122. Id. § 544.

123. U.C.C. 9H 9-308(a), 317(a) (1950 & Supp. 2001).
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enforceable, but if delivery is not complete or a filing has not been
1 24
made, the interest would appear to be avoidable.
In short, Westbrook advocates treating specifically performable
promises as property rights, but he does not stop there. He then
would ask: Is this property right enforceable against third parties?
If the answer is no, then it should not be enforceable in bankruptcy.

In each case, therefore, one must ask what state law requires to
perfect this type of property interest. In most cases, answering
this question will vindicate Countryman's general statement that
specific performance will not lie against the estate. Westbrook's
approach, however, properly focuses the inquiry on whether a
particular property right should be enforced against other creditors
of the estate."1"
When privacy promises are involved, this is a particularly troublesome question. As Westbrook emphasizes, "The analysis becomes
complex in these cases when nonbankruptcy law is unclear about

the Other Party's right to an ITI."126 Current law does not accord

property status to personal information, treats privacy policies as
promissory in nature, and gives few clues as to whether those rights
should be enforceable against the estate.

124. Filing in the Article 9 system only works to perfect a security interest. It does not
generally work to perfect a sale. Sales of accounts, chattel paper, promissory notes, and
payment intangibles are, however, recordable in the Article 9 system. If Article 9 does not
govern the transaction, it is necessary to look to the nonuniform law of the state to determine
how one can perfect one's property interest. See, e.g., Bluxome St. Assocs. v. Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co., 206 Cal. App. 3d 1149, 1154 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (discussing perfection of a lien on
a legal malpractice cause of action under California law).
125. Westbrook, supra note 56. Michael Andrew reaches a similar result by a slightly
different route. Under his approach, executory contracts are not binding upon the estate
until assumed. According to Professor Andrew:
[Tihe supposed "rule" that there is no specific performance in bankruptcy is
actually just a consequence of the fact that the estate itself is not, absent
assumption, bound by the debtor's contracts. Not only is there no right of
specific performance of an unassumed contract against the estate, there is
likewise no right to recover damages against the estate itself-i.e., administratively. The estate is simply not a party to the contract.
Andrew, Executory Contracts,supra note 92, at 920-21. As such, if a specifically enforceable
promise is not assumed, it will not be binding on the estate. Andrew, Reply to Westbrook,
supra note 92, at 28.
126. Westbrook, supra note 56, at 270.
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c. Adequate Protection and Sale Free and Clear
Even if Yachoo's customer list is viewed as property subject to an
encumbrance or secured claim, it may still be possible to override
the privacy policy in bankruptcy. Under § 363 of the Bankruptcy
Code, the debtor has the power to use and sell assets of the debtor
both inside and outside of the ordinary course of business."' When
the sale is outside the ordinary course of business, the debtor must
obtain court approval under §363(c), and if the asset is encumbered,
under § 363(e), the holder of the property interest is entitled to
adequate protection. 128 This may include a continuation of the lien
on the property, in the hands of the purchaser,'29 but under § 363(f),
the bankruptcy court also has the power to allow the debtor to sell
property free and clear of liens under certain circumstances." 0 Such
a sale is likely to be permissible only if applicable nonbankruptcy
law permits such a sale free and clear of liens.' Here, the ill-formed
nature of nonbankruptcy law makes the question impossible to
answer with any confidence.
Thus, if personal information is treated as property held subject
to an encumbrance, there are two undefined terms in the equation.
First, what does it mean to "adequately protect" a website customer's interest in personal information under §§ 361 and 363(e),
127.
128.
129.
130.

11 U.S.C. § 363 (2000).
Id.
U.C.C. § 9-315(a) (1950 & Supp. 2000).
Section 363(f) provides:
The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) or (c) of this section free and

clear ofany interest in such property of an entity other than the estate, only if(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear
of such interest;
(2) such entity consents;
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is to be sold is
greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such property;
(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or
(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept
a money satisfaction of such interest.
11 U.S.C. § 363(f). A website visitor's interest in personal information, to the extent it exists,
is not a lien, not in dispute, and likely to be enforceable by specific performance. As such only
§§ 363(f)(1) and (2) are likely to provide a mechanism for selling personal information.
Although the trustee could attempt to obtain consent, this solution is unlikely to be feasible.
131. Gouveia v. Tazbir, 37 F.3d 295, 299 (7th Cir. 1994).

2003]

MUDDY PROPERTY

1837

and, second, to what extent does "applicable nonbankruptcy law"
permit its sale free of such an interest under § 363(f)? In short,
while the treatment of personal information appears to turn on the
characterization of a privacy policy as creating a contract right or a
property right, the remedial focus proves to be inadequate. Even if
personal information is accorded the status of property, one cannot
administer the property regime without defining the "form" of the
underlying entitlement.
d. Licenses in Bankruptcy
A second approach is to consider the personal information
conveyed to Yachoo as property subject to a limited license. Yachoo's
right to use the information is subject to the terms of the license.
Where patents, trademarks, and copyrights are involved, a license
is structured as a covenant not to sue the licensee for infringement
of the licensor's intellectual property right.'32 As such, if the debtor
wanted to "use" the customer's personal information, it would be
necessary to "assume" or perform the contract pursuant to § 365
of the Bankruptcy Code. In other words, Yachoo would have to
comply with the privacy policy. If the privacy policy provided
that the information could not be disclosed, then the court would
have to determine whether the provision was a valid restriction
on alienation
or an impermissible nonassignment clause under
13 3
§ 365(f).
The problem with characterizing personal information as property
conveyed subject to a license, however, is that, unlike intellectual
property or other personal property, the underlying entitlement is
not clearly defined, if it exists at all. Nonbankruptcy law does not
confer an enforceable property right in personal information, and to
the extent that it does, it is not clear by any means that it continues
132. Hilgraeve Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 265 F.3d 1336,1346 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that
"licenses are considered as nothing more than a promise by the licensor not to sue the

licensee") (quoting Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 1567, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1997)).

133. 11 U.S.C. § 365(f) (2000). Indeed, under current law involving intellectual property
licenses, it is unclear whether it is even permissible for a debtor to assume such a license.
Compare Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 1996),
and Perlman v. Catapult Entm't, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm't, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747 (9th Cir.
1999), with Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489 (1st Cir. 1997).
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once the information has been disclosed to third parties.' While
license law may provide a handy conceptual framework for thinking
about propertizing personal information, again, the difficult task
becomes deciding what shape that right should take. This question,
and the concept of a default license based3 5on fair information
practices, are taken up in more detail below.'
e. Propertyex machina-The FTC Act
Max Headcold suddenly picks his head up off the table and says,
"Enough about property rights that don't exist. What you're saying
is that we can file for bankruptcy, breach the privacy policy, and pay
damages in cents on the dollar. It sounds like we're different from
Toysmart. Let's do it!!"
"Not so fast," you reply. Under current bankruptcy law, the most
likely treatment of a privacy promise is as a contract-based right,
subject to discharge. Nothing about the privacy policy is likely to
entitle it to "property" status. Even though website customers
are likely entitled to specific performance, specific performance
does nothing to enhance their status in bankruptcy. The Toysmart
case provides an object lesson. It was not, in the end, bankruptcy
law that chilled the sale. Toysmart's reorganization consultants
were probably right as a matter of bankruptcy law that the
information could be sold notwithstanding the privacy policy. In the
absence of nonbankruptcy law propertizing privacy promises,
privacy policies seem destined to be treated as liability-based and
subject to discharge. This analysis is likely what led Toysmart's
consultants to advertise the debtor's customer lists as for sale.
The Toysmart result instead was driven by a sort of "property
right ex machina" in the form of the FTC, asserting its authority
under § 5 of the FTC Act""6 and the Children's Online Privacy
134. Lawyers and doctors are a notable exception. Attorney-client privilege and doctorpatient privilege impose a confidentiality obligation on the recipient of the privileged
information and give the client/patient the right to significantly control the manner in which
the information will be used. Courts have noted, however, that contract and privilege are
distinct interests in information. See, e.g., McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431,434 (S.C.
App. 1997).
135. See infra note 246 and accompanying text.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 45(aXl) (2000).
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Protection Act." 7 Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits deceptive trade
practices and empowers the FTC to enjoin such practices.' 3 8 In the
FTC's view, sale of the information in violation of the privacy policy
was just such a "deceptive trade practice." 139 The FTC's suit led the
bankruptcy court to enjoin the sale initially,"' in effect propertizing
the privacy policy. Such publicly-enforced rights help enforce privacy
norms in bankruptcy, but, because there is no private right of action,
enforcement is likely only in cases that are large enough to come to
the attention of federal regulators."1
Curiously, however, even once the FTC was prepared to settle
the case and allow sale under certain circumstances, the bankruptcy court declined
to approve the settlement because it was
"premature."" 2 The bankruptcy judge was unwilling to relinquish
the power to determine the meaning of the privacy policy and the
terms of sale to the FTC. While it is unclear where the bankruptcy
court's authority to do this comes from, other than the court's
general equity power,"' this emphasizes that the institutional locus
for the determination of substantive entitlements to information
privacy in e-commerce transactions remains up for grabs.

137.
138.
139.
2000),
visited

Id. § 6503.
Id. § 45(aXl),(2).
Complaint, FTC v. Toysmart, LLC, No. 80-11341 RGS (Mass. Dist. Ct. filed July 10,
available at http://www.techlawjournal.com/courtsftoysmart/20000710.htm (last
Feb. 25, 2003). The right to be free of deceptive trade practices is an odd form of

property. One result of Calabresi's focus on remedy rather than entitlement, is that many
things that do not fit a traditional image of property are protected by a property rule. Thus,
one's right to be protected from bodily harm is protected both by a liability rule (negligence)

and a property rule (assault and battery). Similarly, the right not to be deceived in the
marketplace is protected both by liability type rules (civil fraud) and by property-type rules
(criminal fraud, FTC enforcement). This focus on remedy maps onto the treatment of rights

in bankruptcy as well. Health and safety regulation is exempted from the automatic stay, 11
U.S.C. § 362(b), and the discharge injunction. Id. § 524.
140. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.

141. Note that in many states there may be a private right of action under the state's law
of deceptive trade practices. For a comparison of private and public enforcement schemes,
see Janger, supra note 23.
142. See Top Stories, supra note 67.
143. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
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D. Inadequacy of CurrentLaw: Privacy Expectations v.
ReorganizationPolicy
Under current contract law, treating privacy promises as liabilitybased obligations subject to discharge serves the bankruptcy goals
of encouraging reorganization and preserving the value of assets for
creditors. On the other hand, it has the disadvantage of defeating
customer expectations of privacy, which are generated by the site's
privacy policy. This bait and switch may have a second order effect
of undercutting confidence in e-commerce and the Internet generally. By contrast, treating personal information as property has
the unfortunate effect of destroying the value of an important asset
of the debtor, when it might be possible to realize the value of that
asset while still safeguarding reasonable consumer expectations."'
II. PROPERTY AND LIABILITY V. CRYSTALS AND MUD
The distinction between property and liability that bedevils
bankruptcy law mirrors a larger nonbankruptcy discussion among
privacy scholars and law and economics scholars about the nature
of property and liability rules. Privacy scholars have recognized this
dichotomy and have become polarized by it. As discussed above,
under current law privacy policies are contracts, protected by a
damages-based remedial scheme and unprotected in bankruptcy."'
Larry Lessig has suggested that treating personal information as
property will allow the creation of a privacy marketplace and solve

144. This uncertainty has given rise to a number of proposed legislative responses. For
example, The Privacy Policy Enforcement Provision in the Bankruptcy Act of 2000 would
have excluded personal information from the bankruptcy estate to the extent that a privacy
policy prohibited disclosure. S. 2857, 106th Cong. § 2 (2000). House Bill 4814 would make
sale of personal information a violation of§ 5 of the FTC Act. H.R. 4814, 106th Cong. (2000).
By comparison, The Consumer Privacy Protection Act would incorporate a number of the
"Fair Information Practices,' see infra Part IV.B, into any proposed sale of personal
information. S. 2606, 106th Cong. § 2 (2000). In the last part of this Article, I discuss one
such proposal for reform. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 420, 107th Cong. § 231 (2001)
(Leahy Amendment). This proposed provision would prohibit any sale of personal information
in violation of a privacy policy, but would permit such sale if the bankruptcy judge concluded
that the sale gave appropriate protection to the data.
145. Schwartz, Lessig's Code, supra note 109, at 776 ("When evaluated within the
Calabresi-Melamed framework, these standards sound in liability rather than property.").
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the problem of cases like Toysmart."' On the other hand, privacy
advocates like Marc Rotenberg ofthe Electronic Privacy Information
Center and privacy scholars like Jessica Litman oppose propertization on the ground that it will lead to the commodification of
something that is innately personal, advocating instead either a
regulatory regime'47 or a tort-based liability regime. 4 '
For the reasons discussed below, both Lessig's property-based
solution and the regulation/tort-based solutions are insufficient
taken alone. Lessig's focus on remedy is incomplete. Even if personal
information is propertized, there are imperfections in the market
for personal information that cast doubt on the ability of the
marketplace to develop appropriate norms for data sharing."' The
Toysmart privacy policy, which prohibits disclosure to outside
parties, 50 is an anomaly in the commercial world. Most privacy
146. LESSIG, supra note 7, at 160.
147. Rotenberg, supra note 11, 1 5 ("In the use of the technique proposed by Lessig, it is
a way to convert political rights into market commodities."). Rotenberg opposes
propertization because he does not want to see a market in personal information:
Brandeis and Warren understood the problem with market-based approaches
to privacy when they wrote the article on the right to privacy more than a
century ago. They purposefully distinguished a privacy right from an
intellectual property claim, noting that copyright typically protects an interest
once publication occurs, privacy protects a right to simply not publish. They
further noted that copyright preserves values that are based on marketplace
determinations, whereas privacy protects values that are unique to each
individual. Lessig's market-based model, which seeks to facilitate the transfer
of control over privacy interests, is clearly at odds with this tradition.
Id. 1 93 (citations omitted).
148. Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/InformationProperty, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283
(2000). Litman writes:
A tort law breach of trust approach does have significant advantages over a
privacy-as-property model. It avoids the trap of alienability and the perverse
incentives that a market in alienable personal data would create. Because it
forgoes the privacy-rights-management market entirely, it is less likely to
legitimize wholesale commercial exploitation ofpersonal information. It would
permit courts to give effect to subtle distinctions between consensual and
invasive disclosure. Moreover, it has some symbolic value as a statement of
societal expectations.
Id. at 1312 (citations omitted); see also William McGeveran, Note, ProgrammedPrivacy
Promises: P3P and Web Privacy Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1812, 1843 (2001) (advocating a
"promise-based" approach to information privacy).
149. See Walter W. Miller, Jr. & Maureen A. O'Rourke, Bankruptcy Law v. PrivacyRights:
Which Holds The Trump Card?, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 852 (2001) (calling for legislative
market reform).
150. 'In the Toysmart case, it is doubtful that anyone thought of the Toysmart privacy
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policies, especially after Toysmart, do not give notice of how personal
information will be protected, but rather explain obliquely how it
may be shared.'51 At the same time, Rotenberg and Litman confuse
remedy with right. Unless personal information is propertized,
individuals will not even be able to enforce the protections for which
they bargain.
This Section looks at the Yachoo hypo from a different angle and
seeks to bridge the gap between Lessig and his critics by linking the
property/liability literature to the rules/standards literature in a
way that has not been done explicitly before. 52
' The property/liability
distinction divides privacy entitlements along the remedial axis
-how a right will be protected. By contrast, the crystals/mud
distinction divides the entitlement on the norm axis-what the
entitlement is. The task in this Section is to develop an account of
the interaction between right and remedy, between the articulation
of substantive legal norms, and the manner in which they are
enforced. 5 ' Just as bankruptcy law fails to deal adequately with
policy as anything more than a promise not to reveal information." Id. at 816.
151. See Richard A. Beckmann, Comment, PrivacyPoliciesand Empty Promises:Closing
The "Toysmart Loophole," 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 765, 788 (2001) ("Within two weeks of Judge
Kenner's rejection of the Toysmart/FTC settlement, bellwether Internet retailer Amazon.com
abruptly revised its privacy policy in an apparent direct response to the Toysmart case.").
152. As noted above, Richard Craswell has made the link implicitly in some of his work
from the "contract" or "liability" side. Craswell, supra note 52, at 3-7, 27-28. Joseph Singer,
in his focus on the expressive content of property law, also touches on the link between the
substance of a property right and the manner in which it is enforced. JOSEPH WILLIAM
SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 112-17 (2000); JOSEPHWLIAM SINGER,
THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF OWNERSHIP 16,20-25 (2000); see
also Jane B. Baron, The Expressive TransparencyofProperty, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 208 (2002).
Pamela Samuelson also has advocated a "trade secrets" regime that is similar to the muddy
property approach advocated here. Samuelson, supra note 73, at 1143, 1151-52. She claims,
however, that her approach does not turn on "propertizing" the right to information. Id. at
1128-29. If this is the case, then it will not provide any protection in bankruptcy.
153. Another note on terminology is important here. Some commentators distinguish
clear from unclear rules by talking about rules and standards. See Louis Kaplow, Rules
Versus Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 612, 618-19 (1992); Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, FairnessVersus Welfare, 114 HARv. L. REV. 961, 1327 (2001);
Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principleof PrivateAutonomy: Lon Fuller's
"Consideration and Form," 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 94-95 (2000); Duncan Kennedy,
Strategizing StrategicBehaviorin Legal Interpretation,1996 UTAH L. REV. 785,816. Others
talk about crystalline and muddy rules. See Janger, supra note 37, at 560; Rose, supra note
8, at 578. At the same time, scholars who talk about property rules and liability rules use the
term "rules" without regard to whether they are clear or unclear. Therefore, from time to
time, I will use the terms "muddy rules" without intending an oxymoron.

20031

MUDDY PROPERTY

1843

privacy norms because the scope of the legal right and its status
are ill-defined, the property/liability literature has never dealt
adequately with the interaction between remedies and underlying
substantive entitlements.
The solution to Lessig, Rotenberg, and Litman's conundrum lies
in paying closer attention to the shape of the property right in
personal information. That property right must be shaped in such
a way that it will enhance the ability of courts-particularly bankruptcy courts-to articulate and enforce privacy norms for personal
data transactions.
A. Property and Liability in a World of Inefficient Bargaining
The first step in understanding Lessig's error is understanding
what he means by "property" and how his focus on property as
remedy serves to establish the primacy of the market in defining the
scope of privacy entitlements. The second step is seeing how certain
predictable market failures make such reliance on the market
troubling in the personal privacy context.
1. Property and Liability
Lessig's view of property rests on the dichotomy articulated in the
path-breaking article PropertyRules andLiabilityRules: Two Views
of the Cathedral,by Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed.'" In
that article, Calabresi and Melamed seek to explain the difference
between property and liability. 5 5 The difference lies along the
remedial axis."s Property rules protect an entitlement with the
154. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1093.
155. Id.
156. Recent work by Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith suggests that remedy is not the
only characteristic that divides property and contract-based liability. The substantive
definitions of property- and contract-based entitlements also manifest predictable differences.
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/ContractInterface, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
773,783 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract]; see also Thomas W. Merrill
& Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardizationin the Law of Property:The Numerus Clausus
Principle,110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000) (explaining the limited and standardized ways of owning
property through information-cost theory). Merrill and Smith point out that property law
tends to govern the relationship between large numbers of people and identifiable things, and
normally take the form of a right to exclude. Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract,supra, at
789-90. Contract rights tend to regulate the behavioral obligations of identified and
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threat of affirmative court order, and/or the sanction of the criminal
law. If a thief were to steal some of Yachoo's inventory of ginseng or
gingko biloba, the thief would be tried criminally and possibly sent
to jail. On the civil side, the thief would be required to pay damages,
but would also be subject to punitive damages to punish the theft.
Liability rules protect an entitlement only with compensatory
damages. If Yachoo were to breach a contract outside of bankruptcy,
it would be required to pay "expectation damages" to put the
nonbreaching party in as good a position as it would have been if the
contract had been performed.157 However, no "punishment" would be
exacted. 158
Carol Rose has characterized a property rule as allocating the
"whole meatball" to the holder of the entitlement, and "zip" to
everyone else. 5 9 Liability rules, by contrast, according to Carol Rose,
Ian Ayres and Eric Talley, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, and
others allocate the right to one person, and the right to take and
pay to others. 06 The Calabresian insight was that property rules
facilitate bargaining by clarifying entitlements. By contrast, when
bargaining is very difficult or impossible, liability rules provide an
identifiable people to one another. Id. at 799-800. In their view, these characteristics cause
a tendency toward bright-line rules and standardized property rights, whereas contractual
arrangements tend to be more complex and highly customized. Id. at 778-79.
This prediction about property rules does not necessarily conflict with the theory of muddy
property rights articulated in this Article. The claim that property relationships tend to
evolve toward standardized forms is not inconsistent with the proposition that new forms of
property, and property relationships where ownership is uncertain, will tend to be muddy
until, on the one hand, the standard ownership norms are defined (i.e., a holder of someone
else's information knows what they are entitled to do with it), or until the identity of the
owner is defined (i.e., the website customer or the website).
Harold Demsetz explained this process of developing property relationships thus:
[P]roperty rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of
internalization become larger than the cost of internalization. Increased
internalization, in the main, results from changes in economic values, changes
which stem from the development of new technology and the opening of new
markets, changes to which old property rights are poorly attuned.
1 HAROLD DEMSETZ, OWNERSHIP, CONTROL, AND THE FIRM: THE ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC
ACTMIVTY 107 (1988). For a more developed response to Smith and Merrill, see articles cited

supra note 23.
157. 11 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 992 (Interim ed., reprint of chs.

55-60 in 1964 ed., vol. 5).
158. Id. § 1077.
159. Rose, supra note 25, at 2179.
160. Id. at 2176-79, 2190.
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means of allocating damages after a deprivation has
alternative
6 1
occurred.
Two polar examples are a negotiation over a sale of real estate
and an automobile accident. When a buyer wishes to purchase
Blackacre from a seller under a property rule, both the buyer and
the seller know where the entitlement lies. This facilitates bargaining. The seller owns Blackacre and the buyer must offer a price
that satisfies the seller in order to obtain any right to Blackacre.
Otherwise, the buyer has "zip." When an automobile accident is
involved, bargaining will not work. It is impossible for driver and
pedestrian to negotiate a price before the accident. Tort liability
seeks to repair the damage by financially approximating the harm.
2. Information-ForcingLiability Rules
The paradigm of the traffic accident becomes problematic when
one recognizes that contract law also relies on liability-based
remedies to enforce executory obligations. Ian Ayres and Eric
Talley, 1 62 and Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell6 3 seek to answer
this question by pointing out that property rules may not always
facilitate bargaining towards efficient resource allocation. By
allocating the whole entitlement to the owner of Blackacre, property
rules create a "bilateral monopoly."" 4 Buyer and seller have no
choice but to bargain with each other.' 5 If, as Calabresi and
Melamed assume,'6 6 both parties have perfect information about
the value of the property ascribed by each of the parties, this will
not create obstacles to bargaining. When there is an information
asymmetry, however, and one party knows more about the value of
161. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1116.
162. Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, DistinguishingBetween Consensual and Nonconsensual
Advantages ofLiability Rules, 105 Yale L.J. 235, 239-40 (1995) [hereinafter Ayres & Talley,
Advantages]; Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:Dividinga Legal Entitlement
to Facilitatea Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1032-33 (1995) [hereinafter Ayres &
Talley, Solomonic Bargaining].
163. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do Liability Rules FacilitateBargaining?A Reply
toAyres and Taley, 105 YALE L.J. 221,223-24 (1995) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Reply];
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules 109 HARV.L. REV.
713, 736 (1996).
164. GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 207 (3d ed., 1966).
165. Id.
166. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1096-97.
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the property than another, or, as is even more common, the parties
know their own valuations but not the valuation ascribed to the
property by the other party, then it is likely that the property rule
coupled with the information asymmetry may cause the parties to
miss what would otherwise be an efficient "Coasean" trade. 167 In
such cases, liability rules may be more efficient. As Ayres and Talley
put it:
Our core insight was that dividing an entitlement between two
negotiators could cause more forthright and efficient bargaining.
Essentially, we argued that these so-called Solomonic divisions
tend to obscure the titular boundary between "buyer"and "seller"
during bargaining and, in so doing, dampen the parties' strategic
incentives to "shade up" or "shade down" their privately known
valuations. 18

Kaplow and Shavell make a similar point, but argue that the
efficiency of liability169rules turns on encouraging nonconsensual, but
efficient transfers.

To illustrate the Ayres and Talley insight with a gloss from
Kaplow and Shavell, imagine that when Yachoo built its warehouse
in an industrial park in New Jersey, it purchased a one acre lot.
The lot borders a farm owned by Farmer Bob. Farmer Bob has had
a series of bad harvests and wants to sell off a few acres to a real
estate developer to help keep his family farm afloat. A real estate
developer has offered to buy a piece of the farm adjoining Yachoo's
warehouse. The only access to Bob's property suitable for heavy
construction equipment, however, runs across a piece of Yachoo's
property. Yachoo has no interest in that corner, and values the easement desired by Bob at $20,000. By contrast, the farmer estimates
that the easement adds $50,000 to the value of his property. As
167. Ayres & Talley, Solomonic Bargaining,supra note 162, at 1088.
168. Ayres & Talley, Advantages, supra note 162, at 237.
169. Kaplow & Shavell, Reply, supra note 163, at 230. Kaplow and Shavell explain:
Under this alternative assumption, it can be shown that the advantage of the
liability rule in terms of total welfare is much larger than in their example
($2.25 rather than $0.125), yet there are no successful bargains under the
liability rule. Obviously, the (now greater) advantage of the liability rule cannot
be attributed to the facilitation of bargaining, for there is none.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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such, Bob is the "higher value" user. A transfer of the property to
Bob would be Kaldor-Hicks efficient, and a transfer at any price
between $20,000 and $50,000, would be Pareto superior.7 °
Headcold knows nothing about the farmer's development plans,
and the farmer has no idea whether Yachoo has plans for the parcel.
Both, however, want to get as much for the easement as they can.
The farmer decides to offer $10,000 for the property. Headcold
responds strategically. He lies, saying that the parcel is important
to Yachoo's plans to expand its warehouse, and that he will not
agree to sell the easement for less than $70,000. With these two
offers on the table, nothing will happen. Indeed, the gap appears so
great that even a counteroffer is unlikely. Neither party is willing to
deal at the other's stated price, even though there are prices at
which both would be willing to trade. Strategic behavior and information problems cause the parties to miss an efficient trade.
Ayres and Talley explain that liability rules can help overcome
this informational and strategic logjam. They argue that liability
rules have the effect of forcing out private information about
valuation.1 7 ' Therefore if Yachoo's rights were protected by a
liability rule, the ability of Farmer Bob to take the entitlement (i.e.,
trespass), and pay damages would reduce the bilateral monopoly
problem. The holder of an entitlement under a liability rule (Yachoo)
does not hold the whole meatball, but instead holds the meatball
subject to an option. If a potential purchaser of an entitlement protected by a liability rule (Farmer Bob) states his willingness to "take
and pay," he signals to the entitlement holder (Yachoo) that he is a
high-value user of the entitlement. This has the effect of narrowing
the settlement range, reducing the value of strategic behavior, and
may facilitate a trade.
Kaplow and Shavell ask, "Why is it even necessary to force out
information? Why doesn't Bob simply exercise his option?"'7 2 The
answer is that Bob does not know the option price with certainty.
If Bob takes, he must pay compensatory damages. The damages
are determined based on the harm to Yachoo. Unless property
is fungible, the amount of harm to Yachoo will be unknown, and
170. For a discussion of the Kaldor-Hicks and Pareto definitions of efficiency, see JULES
L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAw 84 (1988).
171. Ayers & Talley, Solomonic Bargaining,supra note 162, at 1061.
172. Kaplow & Shavell, Reply, supra note 163, at 232 &'n.41.
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determining damages will have costs. As a result, Bob faces a risk
if he trespasses. Nonetheless, Bob's threat to trespass conveys to
Yachoo the information that Bob is a higher valued user, and
because Headcold and Yachoo do not know Bob's valuation, they face
the risk of a nonconsensual taking.
In short, by permitting a nonconsensual taking and payment of
damages, a liability rule has the effect of forcing out information
about valuation and/or facilitating efficient transfers ofthe property.
3. PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Privacy Promises-The
"Lemons Equilibrium"
Unfortunately, applying the Calabresi and Melamed and Ayres
and Talley insights to privacy promises does not help much. At first
glance, there do not appear to be any huge obstacles to bargaining
over transactions in personal information. Individuals who know
what information they are selling should be able to price the
transaction. Individuals who know what information they are
buying should be able to set a price they are willing to pay. This
apparent transparency supports applying a property rule. Furthermore, to the extent that transactions in personal information are
viewed as "easy transactions," propertizing information seems a
plausible solution.
It is Lessig's facile acceptance of transactions in personal
information as "easy," that is his undoing. In his book, Code and
Other Laws of Cyberspace, he proposes propertizing personal
information and allowing technology to sort out the bargaining problems. 1 3 He points to the so-called "Protocol for Privacy Protection"
or "P3P," which seeks to accomplish this through technology' 74 by
allowing website customers to program their privacy preferences in

173. As Lessig states:
The law would be a kind of property right in privacy. Individuals must have

both the ability to negotiate easily over privacy rights and the entitlement to
privacy as a default. That is property's purpose: it says to those who want, you
must negotiate before you can take. P3P is the architecture to facilitate that
negotiation; the law is the rule that says negotiation must occur.

LESSIG, supra note 7, at 160. For a concise description of P3P, see McGeveran, supra note
148, at 1826-33.

174. Schwartz, Lessig's Code, supra note 109, at 744, 749.
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advance, and then allowing the computer to negotiate the terms
under which they will be granted access to websites.'7 5
At present, however, the market for personal information is a
much less friendly place than Lessig envisions, and "hard" privacy
policies like Toysmart's and Yachoo's are not the norm. Indeed,
they are increasingly the exception. As Paul Schwartz has pointed
out, propertization of personal information alone is not a sufficient
solution. 176 Neither will information-forcing liability rules remedy
the problem. The imperfection in the market for personal information is not the result of an information logjam that obstructs
trades. Instead, there are significant information asymmetries
which make trading personal information easier than it should be.
First, consumers do not have particularly good information about
the type of data that is being gathered, or about how it is being used.
Second, they do not have good information about the value of the
data that they are disclosing, either to themselves or to the website.
Third, consumer information transactions take the form of contracts of adhesion. The customers must give information, or they
cannot buy goods on the website. In the absence of a functioning
privacy market, consumers who wish to surf the web must accept
the website's terms. Finally, surfers do not have good information
about breach. Once personal information is "leaked," it is difficult to
discover the source of the leak. Website visitors simply do not know
what they are giving up, and giving personal information the status
of "property" does not help solve this problem.
Some of these characteristics of the e-commerce privacy market
may remedy themselves over time. The development of any such
market solution is impeded, however, by the fact that, for the most
part, individual websites lack an incentive to offer enhanced privacy
protection. As Schwartz has noted, "[a] critical mass of sophisticated
privacy consumers is not yet emerging."' Broadly speaking, the
feasibility of negotiation under a property rule or a liability rule
turns on the value of the item, the transparency of the transaction,
and the availability of substitutes. The problem in the privacy
marketplace is that the value of the item is relatively small, and the
175. LESSIG, supra note 7, at 160-61.
176. Schwartz, Lessig's Code, supra note 109, at 745.

177. Schwartz, Privacy and the State, supra note 109, at 822.
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transaction is not transparent. If Yachoo has bad privacy practices
and cannot be relied on to keep a customer's brand of aromatherapy
mouthwash confidential, the customer can simply switch to
Drugstore.com. As I have noted, however, e-customers do not, by
and large, understand what information is being gathered, how it is
being used, and what it is worth. 178 Because the item's value is
relatively small, customized negotiation is not efficient. 1 79 As a
result, many web surfers give personal information without
considering how it might be used.'8 ° Only the website owner knows
the information has value. As a result, the information can, in the
present environment, be gathered for free.
The current absence of a privacy market is stable, so long as the
information asymmetry is maintained. This is what economists
sometimes call a "Lemons Equilibrium. ""'s As Richard Craswell
178. See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 501,506,509(1999). Lessig describes the invisibility ofcyberspace monitoring: "Data

is collected, but without your knowledge. Thus you cannot ... choose whether you will
participate in or consent to this surveillance.... Nothing reveals whether you are being
watched, so there is no real basis upon which to consent." Id. at 505 (footnote omitted); see
also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal
Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395, 476 (2000) ("[Mlost users are not even aware that
the web sites they visit collect user information, and even if they are cognizant of that
possibility, they have little conception of how personal data might be processed.").
179. Although websites by and large have posted privacy policies, it is not realistic to
expect every customer who clicks through the site to read the policy, nor is it realistic to
equate the use of the site as consent to the policy, whatever it might say. As Paul Schwartz
has said, "privacy-consent neglects the actual conditions of choice regarding the processing
of personal information, and permits notice to become an alibi for 'take-it-or-leave-it' data
processing. Notice is emerging as the justification for a legal fiction of implied consent on the
Internet." Schwartz, Privacy and the State, supra note 109, at 825. However, even privacy
policies play an ambiguous role in the developing privacy market. Many privacy policies are
not what they seem. Often they are disclosure consent policies rather than privacy protection
policies.
180. Interestingly, the first reported instance of a dot-corn offering to pay for personal
information occurred as the result of a sale in bankruptcy. See Michelle Slatalla, Online
Shopper: Giving Up Privacyfor a BargainPrice,N.Y. TIMES, July 26,2001, at G4 (explaining
that when eToys went bankrupt, they sent an email to their customers suggesting that they
shop at KBKids.com and noting that if the customer approved the transfer of information
from eToys to KBKids.com, KBKids.com would offer them a $5.00 coupon in return).
181. George Ackerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph E. Stiglitz won the 2001 Nobel Prize
in Economics for their work on the effect of asymmetric information on markets. See Press
Release, The 2001 Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences in
Memory of Alfred Nobel (Oct. 10, 2001), available at http://www.nobel.se/economics/
laureates/2001/press.html (last visited Feb. 12,2003); see also George A. Akerlof, The Market
for "Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970);
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points out, such an equilibrium can develop, when buyers have good
information about price, but bad information about nonprice terms

like privacy protection:
[I]f sellers are competing with each other but buyers are not
well-informed, the absence of better terms can result from a
"lemons" equilibrium. Because terms that are good for buyers are
generally more expensive for sellers, any seller that offers better
terms will charge a higher price to make the same level of profits
she could make by offering less favorable terms at a lower price.
However, if most buyers have good information aboutprices but
only poor informationabout nonprice terms, they may not notice
an improvement in nonprice terms, while they will definitely
notice the higher price. As a result, many buyers may stop
purchasing from this seller. If the number of buyers who stop
purchasing is sufficiently large, the seller will end up losing
money as a result of her decision to offer the more favorable
terms at a higher price. In that case, no seller has an incentive to
offer the more favorable terms, and the result is an equilibrium
in which only bad contractterms (or"lemons")can be obtained."2
To make matters worse, improving the quality of notice may not be
a solution. The most recent development in the privacy market is
the widespread mailing of privacy notices mandated by Gramm-

Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An
Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 488, 492-93 (1976); Joseph
Stiglitz,Equilibrium in ProductMarkets with Imperfect Information, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 33945 (1979); Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer
Liability, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 561 (1977).
182. Craswell, PropertyRules, supra note 52, at 49 (emphasis added). Steve Ware argues
that this is not harmful if the "lemons" equilibrium occurs in an otherwise competitive
market. Ware, supra note 34, at 212-13 n.95. Under his view, if websites are able to make
money by selling personal information, this will allow them to sell goods on the website at
a lower price. Id. Because all sellers will be selling both goods and information, the
competition will eliminate the surplus, and the consumer will, in effect, pay the lower price
for the product, without privacy, than he/she would have paid for the product with privacy.
Id. This argument, however, makes a heroic empirical assumption that the value of personal
information to marketers (i.e., what the marketers would pay) is the same as the amount
that website customers would charge if they knew what information they were giving up.
In other words, consumers might prefer to pay more in order to get privacy than the
marketers benefit from having the information. There is no way to know, however, because
the alternative transaction is not available.
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Leach-Bailey.8 3 To the extent that such policies have had any effect,
it appears to be to increase the amount4 of mail, perceived as "junk"
8
that consumers throw away unread.
Ayres and Talley point out that liability rules may work better
when there is imperfect information about valuation.' 85 Information
problems and adhesion problems thus counsel a liability rule,8 6 but
the information asymmetry present in the privacy market is not of
the type that would be remedied by Ayres and Talley's liabilitybased regime, which assumes that information problems obstruct
efficient transactions rather than facilitate inefficient ones.
This is the first place in the analysis where the inadequacy of
Lessig's remedial focus becomes apparent. The information that is
missing is not principally information about the value of personal
information to websites, although that is certainly part of it. Also
missing is information about behavior: what data is being gathered;
how that information is being used; with whom it is being shared.
With the exception of a few bankruptcy sophisticates, who understand that all commercial behavior involves assessments of credit
risk, few website customers are likely to realize that the website's
privacy policy may be worthless if the website goes bankrupt.
Property rule or liability rule, the result is the same. Customers give
their information away for free. When these imperfections in the
privacy market are identified, they cast doubt upon the market itself
as a mechanism for generating the price and terms of personal data
sharing relationships.

183. See Janger & Schwartz, supra note 34.
184. Press Release, American Bankers Assoc., ABA Survey Shows Nearly One Out of
Three Consumers Read Their Bank's Privacy Notices (June 15, 2001), available at

http://www.aba.com/Press+Room/bankfee06070l.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2003); Mark
Hochhauser, Lost in the Fine Print:Readability ofFinancialPrivacyNotices (July 2001); at
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/GLB-Reading.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2003).
185. Ayres & Talley, Solomonic Bargaining, supra note 162, at 1030 ("[D]ivided
entitlements can facilitate trade by inducing claim holders to reveal more information than
they would under an undivided entitlement regime. Owners of divided, or 'Solomonic,'
entitlements must bargain more forthrightly than owners of undivided entitlements, because
the entitlement division obscures the titular boundary between 'buyer' and 'seller.').
186. Id.
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B. The Lemons Equilibrium,the Coase Theorem, and the
Incoherence of the Property/LiabilityDistinction
The incoherence of the property/liability analysis in the information privacy context exposes an important deficiency in the
property/liability literature as a whole. The Calabresian architecture
ignores the shape of the underlying entitlement. 18 7 What private and
public behavioral norms are being guarded by the substantive legal
or contractual rule? This focus on remedy relies on the idea,
promulgated by Ronald Coase, that in a world without transaction
costs, the underlying allocation of rights is irrelevant, because
parties will be able to contract their way to an efficient allocation of
resources."8 ' In a world of Coasean bargains, the goal of the law is
to construct a remedial scheme that facilitates efficient allocations
of rights.8 9 Thus property rules are appropriate when bargaining is
easy, but liability rules are necessary to substitute for (or facilitate)
bargaining9° when there are information asymmetries or other
obstacles.'

Because of the existence of a lemons equilibrium, however,
bargaining over information entitlements is not likely to lead to
efficient outcomes. For many transactions, remedying the information asymmetry or engaging in particularized negotiation may
not be efficient, and use of a liability rule will not force out the
missing information. The goal of any privacy regime should be to
determine how to remedy the information asymmetry when possible,
and to the extent that it is not possible, a privacy regime should
provide efficient off-the-shelf terms.19 ' Coasean bargaining, however,
is not likely to be a source of efficient substantive entitlements.
187. Ayres and Talley do recognize that uncertainty about entitlements is another way of
"dividing" them, and they include an analysis of "probabilistic" entitlements in their
discussion. Id. at 1073-74. However, they miss the fundamental distinction between "right"
and "remedy" and how it alters the shape of negotiations.
188. There is reason to believe that Coase himself, unlike many of his followers, did not
think that his assumptions had anything to do with the real world of contracts. Professor

Paul Shupack at the Benjamin Cardozo School of Law tells of a colloquium he attended at
the University of Chicago, where Coase castigated his colleagues stating that the point of the
Coase theorem was that one had to study transaction costs rather than assume them away.

189. Coase, supra note 28, at 2-15.
190. Id.
191. The next Section addresses whether these terms should be mandatory, sticky, or
waivable, and whether they should be property- or liability-based.
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C. DefiningEntitlements-Crystals,Mud, and Institutional
Choice
The preceding discussion demonstrates that the architecture of
the cathedral focuses on remedy and ignores substantive legal
norms. The indeterminacy of the property/liability discussion turns
on the fact that the shape of the underlying entitlement with
regard to personal information is ill-formed and cannot be generated
through negotiation. There are not yet well-formed substantive
defaults for the privacy norms associated with e-commerce transactions. This willingness of Calabresi and Melamed to ignore substantive entitlements flows from the Coasean insight that, in a
world offree bargaining, and in the absence of transaction costs, any
initial allocation of entitlements after a series of trades will yield an
efficient allocation of resources.192 In a Coasean world, property
rules are king and the shape of substantive entitlements can be
determined by contract.19
When bargaining cannot be relied on to shape entitlements,
however, there must be another source of substantive rights.' If
192. Coase, supra note 28, at 2-15.
193. Not all analyses of property and liability rules ignore the link with substantive
entitlements. Craswell, for example, explains:
First, the law must develop some definition of 'proper" consent. Second, in
those cases lacking proper consent, courts must decide whether to protect Y
with a property rule or a liability rule. Third, in those cases where Y is
protected with a liability rule, there must be some criteria by which the court
can decide what obligation would be most "reasonable."
Craswell, PropertyRules, supra note 52, at 6.
Craswell, however, seeks to sidestep the question of nonconsent based norms. Indeed,
when forced to talk about substantive rules, he notes:
The principle of free contract is by now so widely accepted that most modem
observers would regard almost any term adopted with each party's full consent
as just. As a result, when modem observers are forced to select contract terms
on behalf of parties who are unable to consent, it is difficult to find any
substantive criteria to fall back upon other than criteria based on the parties'
own preferences, either actual or ideal.
Id. at 27.
194. The Calabresian answer to this question is also inadequate. Calabresi and Melamed
would say that the inability to bargain counsels a liability rule. Calabresi & Melamed, supra
note 9, at 1106-07. Allow the deprivation, but impose damages. Id. As Carol Rose has noted,
however, Calabresi had certain real world examples lurking in the shadows when he
formulated his scheme. Rose, supra note 25, at 2176 ("In spite of Boomer's quite visible
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substantive rights are not derived from meaningful consent, they
must come from somewhere else:' 95 from legislation, from regulation,
or from judicial decision. When privacy promises are involved, there
is no universally accepted set of legal norms that can form the basis
for liability or property rights. 9 ' Where should such norms be
generated, and what legal status should they be given? Because
the market cannot be relied on to generate efficient substantive
entitlements, courts and legislatures will have to develop these
entitlements.
In this Section, I will argue that muddy rules provide an alternative device for dividing entitlements that may help to protect
and shape behavioral norms where contracting is likely to fail.
Unlike liability rules, which divide entitlements based on remedy
andforce out valuation related information,muddy rules divide the
substantiveentitlementitself,andforce out informationrelatedto the
contested norm. The choice of a muddy rule has implications both for
the choice of institutional decision maker and for the efficiency of
decision making. Once I have described the impact of muddy rules,
appearance in The Cathedral,a rather different example lurks in the shadows--something
I will call a 'shadow example'-that actually drives the analysis."). For Calabresi and
Melamed, the shadow example was tort law, or the law of accidents. Id. The duties were
understood to derive from the common law of torts informed by the Hand Rule. Private
ordering gave way silently, at least in part, to noncontractual legal norms.
195. See Janger & Schwartz, supra note 34. These substantive entitlements may also be
referred to as contractual defaults. Id. Default terms are implied in contracts where the
parties have not fully specified their agreements. The defaults may seek to approximate a
hypothetical agreement, or they may seek to encourage certain behavioral norms. Id.; see
also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarianvs. MinoritarianDefaults, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1591 (1999); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic ContractualInefficiency and the Optimal
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, FillingGaps
in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 89 (1989)
("Few academics have gone beyond one-sentence theories stipulating that default terms
should be set at what the parties would have wanted.'). Such defaults may be easily
waivable, or they may be sticky. When they become "mandatory," they leave the realm of
contract, except to the extent that they become implied-by-law terms of the contractual
relationship.
196. As I will discuss later, fair information practices (FIPs) are emerging as a common
framework for formulating these rights. Janger & Schwartz, supra note 34; Schwartz,
Privacy in Cyberspace,supra note 109, at 1614. For a description of earlyproposals regarding
fair information practices, see DAVID FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE

SOCIETIES 306-10 (1989). For a more recent governmental discussion of a somewhat different
set of fair information practices, see FTC PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7-12
(1998). Even if one accepts FIPs as a framework, however, their application is necessarily
context specific.
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I will attempt to demonstrate that the literature on privacy, and the
rules/standards literature, suffer from their own incoherence
because of a failure to consider the interaction between the
definition of a right and its remedy. The salutary effects of muddy
rules are most evident when the muddy rule is linked to a property
rule, and the effects of muddy rules are somewhat unpredictable
when linked to a liability rule.
1. Institutional Choice and InstitutionalCompetence
Legislatures generate rules by passing statutes. Regulatory
agencies create laws by promulgating rules and issuing opinions
in agency adjudications. Courts generate legal rules by issuing opinions. Each of these lawmaking institutions has different advantages
and disadvantages.19 7
Courts can get a good look at the parties and can analyze a
particular transaction, but they may not be able to view the broad
sweep of all similar transactions or behavior or see how a particular
rule or ruling might operate in other, perhaps more common,
situations. Courts also have the ability to adapt by looking at particular cases, distinguishing them from earlier cases, and articulating
the basis for distinction.' 98 Finally, courts lack a broad independent
basis for the legitimacy of their actions.'99 They must rely on the
Constitution, statutes, regulations, or principles of the common law
to frame their decisions.2
Legislatures, by contrast, are elected and have a legitimate basis
for legislative authority. They also have the ability to gather facts,
and take a broader policy-based view of a particular problem.
Legislators are generalists, however, and may lack both the ability
to see how these principles will operate in particular cases, and the
expertise to know about the details of the particular area. Finally,
legislation is inflexible and often difficult to amend. 20 1 As such,
197. See generally NEIL KOmESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATrvES (1994).

198. In this regard, common law rulemaking has a temporal component that legislation
lacks. Courts interpreting statutes have information at their disposal that the enacting
legislature lacked. See infra text accompanying notes 222-23.
199. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
200. Id.
201. See Edward J. Janger, The Locus of Lawmaking: Uniform State Law, Bankruptcy
Law, and BankruptcyReform, 74 AM. BAKR. L.J. 97, 111-12 (2000) (discussing the problems
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unlike courts, which can reshape rules on the fly, legislative rules
tend to lock-in, even after the underlying conditions have changed.
Agencies are a hybrid. When rulemaking, they have particularized
expertise that both courts and legislatures lack, but they lack the
legitimacy of legislatures and the independence of courts. When
adjudicating, administrative law judges function like courts, except
that the administrative law judge may have particular expertise
regarding cases within the agency's jurisdiction.
The legal norms generated by these processes can take the form
of mandatory rules, which become implied terms in all contracts, or
default rules, which govern unless the parties agree otherwise. In
either case, the rules chosen will apply to the parties through the
interaction of courts and the marketplace. Disputes either will be
resolved through a legal decision or through an agreement hammered out in the shadow of the legal norm. There are, therefore,
two institutional decisions to make. First, which institution will
generate the substantive entitlements-legislature, courts, or the
market? Second, which institution will resolve disputes-courts,
including agency based adjudication, or the marketplace? These
two questions are interdependent. How a rule is drafted will affect
which institution makes the decision in each individual case. Which
institution decides individual cases will affect the ability of the other
institutions to craft rules.
2. Crystals, Mud, and InstitutionalChoice: Dividing
Entitlements Along the Norm Axis
A partial answer to these questions of institutional competence
lies in the choice between crystals and mud.20 2 How entitlements
are structured influences where disputes will be resolved and,
therefore, which institutions will interpret and shape the scope of
the entitlements. As I stated earlier, crystals and mud are the key
determinants of institutional choice. The rules/standards literature
recognizes that, in general, mud does not facilitate transactions; it
encourages disputes. When parties are uncertain about who holds
met by Congress during its effort to pass the Bankruptcy Reform Bill).
202. As discussed below, however, this choice must be made with close attention to the
status of the right as a property- or liability-based entitlement. See infra text accompanying
notes 214-18.
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an entitlement or whether certain behavior is permitted, they are
likely to differ over the relative probabilities of a particular judicial
outcome. The dispute may have to be resolved authoritatively after
litigation. Muddy standards, therefore, increase the number of
disputes, and increase the likelihood that a particular dispute will
be resolved by a court. Ifjudicial decision making is desired, °3 then
a muddy standard will place the judge front and center. Muddy
standards and crystalline rules can be created both by courts and by
legislatures. Courts that distrust the marketplace may choose mud.
By contrast, legislators that distrust courts can maintain control by
enacting a crystalline prohibition, or turn the decision over to the
marketplace by enacting a crystalline safe harbor.
As I have discussed elsewhere,20' the common wisdom is that,
other things being equal, a hard-edged rule is preferable to a muddy
standard.0 5 If parties can agree without judicial intervention,
litigation costs are saved, court time is saved, and transactions are
facilitated. 0 6 Muddy standards, however, have a number of underappreciated benefits which turn on the fact that disputes in the
shadow of judicial decision making are not always a bad thing. In
particular, muddy standards may be more effective at enforcing
norms, at the behavioral level, than crystalline rules. 2 7 As Carol
Rose eloquently states:
From this perspective, as indeed the more sophisticated economic
analyses tell us, crystalline rules seem less the king of the
efficiency mountain than we may normally assume. One can
argue that elaborate ex post allocations of responsibilities might
be efficient too, even if they make people's entitlements fuzzier
ex ante. The very knowledge that one cannot gull someone else,
203. This can be case by case judicial decision making or judicial norm generation.
204. See Edward J. Janger, Muddy Rules for Securitizations,7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.

L. 301, 313-14 (2002).
205. Rules have a number of advantages: they are predictable; violations are easy to
identify; it is easy to bring behavior into compliance; and it is easier to negotiate around
them because they are well-defined.
206. Crystalline rules have a number of disadvantages; they may be over- or
underinclusive, or they may lead to undercompliance because of incomplete enforcement. See
generally Keith N. Hylton, The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence Under Strict
Liability and Under Negligence, 10 INT'L L. REV. & ECON. 161, 163-64 (1990) (arguing that
strict liability schemes lead to underdeterrence).
207. See Janger, supra note 37, at 565; Rose, supra note 8, at 600.

2003]

MUDDY PROPERTY

1859

and get away with it, makes it less likely that anyone will
dissipate time and effort in trying to find the gullible.m
If their behavior is close to the regulated line, muddy rules force
parties to avert to the possibility of judicial scrutiny. For example,
at the negotiation stage, a muddy rule about fraud may encourage
parties to disclose information in order to reduce the likelihood that
failure to disclose will later be viewed as fraudulent.
3. Muddy Rules and Norm-Related Information-Forcing
To put it another way, just as entitlements can be divided by
substituting liability for property, they can be divided by substituting mud for crystals. Liability rules divide entitlements by
allowing nonconsensual takings; 9 muddy rules make it less clear
where an entitlement lies, and therefore, increase the likelihood
of disputes. The difference between these two methods of dividing
entitlements, however, is as crucial as the similarity. Dividing
entitlements on the remedial axis, based on the status of the
entitlement, generates information about valuation, and/or reduces
the extent to which differences of opinion about valuation will
serve as an obstacle to efficient resource allocation. Liability rules
encourage efficient transactions and efficient asset transfers by
narrowing the gap in those valuations and by permitting nonconsensual takings. 210 By contrast, dividing entitlements on the
normative axis, using a muddy form of entitlement, will force out
norm-related information, and influence norm-related behavior
through the threatofjudicial decision making.
The manner in which muddy rules force out norm-related
information and affect behavior is hard to reduce to mathematical
precision. Perhaps it is better to explain the dynamic with another
example. Imagine that in a business-to-business transaction
Yachoo obtains some confidential, but unpatented, business process information from one of its software manufacturers, BizPro.
After entering into the arrangement, Yachoo starts another line
of business through an affiliated company. The business process
208. Rose, supra note 8, at 600.
209. See supra text accompanying note 169.

210. See supra text accompanying notes 167-72.
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information obtained from BizPro would be useful to the affiliate.
Yachoo promised BizPro that it would not disclose this information,
but believes that a disclosure to an affiliate is within the scope of the
original agreement. Yachoo is worried, however, that BizPro might
disagree. Yachoo anticipates a dispute about the scope of the
confidentiality agreement, and must decide either to disclose its
behavior to BizPro and negotiate a resolution, or to use the
information now and ask questions later. The agreement is silent
about information transfers to affiliates. Therefore, for these
purposes, Yachoo's confidentiality obligations are muddy.
A muddy standard regarding disclosure to affiliates would operate
differently from a crystalline rule prohibiting such disclosure. A
crystalline prohibition would yield one of two effects: either no
transaction and no disclosure would occur, or Yachoo would
approach BizPro and ask for permission (or threaten) to disclose its
information. Here, the discussion would focus solely on valuation.
How much will Yachoo have to pay BizPro for permission to
disclose?
By contrast, if Yachoo's nondisclosure obligation is silent or
muddy with regard to disclosure to affiliates, the conversation will
look very different. Instead, Yachoo will have an incentive to clarify
its right to disclose. If Yachoo signals its intention to disclose
the information, the discussion with BizPro will not initially
focus on price, but rather on whether Yachoo is entitled to disclose
the information to its affiliate. In other words, is the affiliate's use
of the information within the scope of the original terms of the
contract or not? The discussion will focus on the norms of the datasharing relationship. Why was the information given? How was it to
be used, and by whom? How will the information be used by the
affiliate? Although the discussion may ultimately turn to price,
the initial discussion will be about the shape of the underlying
entitlement. 1
A muddy standard, like a liability rule, therefore, has an
information-forcing effect, but they each force out different kinds of
information. The information forced out by a muddy standard
focuses on norm-related behavior, rather than on information about
valuation.
211. See STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 3.20, at 154-58 (2001).
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D. A Typology of Entitlements
Just as the property/liability discussion assumes crystalline
entitlements and becomes incoherent when the shape of the
underlying entitlement is unclear, so the crystals and mud
conversation assumes that entitlements are protected as property.
When the entitlement is protected by a liability rule instead, the
information-forcing effect of mud may be severely diluted. The
crystals and mud literature assumes only two options: judicial
decision or consensual bargain in the shadow of a judicial decision.
If the entitlement is protected by a liability rule, however, there is
a third option. Liability rules introduce the possibility for nonconsensual takings; the nonholder can simply elect to violate the
entitlement and pay damages.2 12 This is true whether the liability
rule is crystalline or muddy, and the choice of a liability rule will
have a significant impact on the information-forcing effects of that
rule.
In other words, a particular transaction can be governed by a
crystalline liability rule, a crystalline property right, a muddy
liability rule, or a muddy property right, with each one having its
own respective advantages and disadvantages. In each case, the
more crystalline or property-like the entitlement, the more it can be
said that the entitlement holder has the complete entitlement or
"whole meatball." Alternatively, the more muddy or liability-like the
entitlement, the more the entitlement is shared by the respective
entitlement holders. The key point, however, is that "liability" and
"mud" have fundamentally different effects. In order to see the
differences, it is useful to show the typology of entitlements
graphically.

212. See supra text accompanying note 167-72.
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Typology of Entitlements
Remedial Axis
Property

Liability

Crystal

Nonholder (Nothing),
Holder (Complete
Entitlement)

Nonholder (Option),
Holder (Entitlement
Subject to Option)

Mud

Nonholder (Possible
Entitlement), Holder
(Complete
Entitlement Subject
to Possible
Entitlement)

Nonholder (Option
and Possible
Entitlement), Holder
(Entitlement Subject
to Option and
Possible

z

I

Entitlement)

The top two boxes of the table, crystalline property rules and crystalline liability rules, do not add anything to the property/liability
discussion. The property/liability literature views entitlements as
exogenous and, in effect, assumes crystals. The lower two boxes are
more interesting. Muddy entitlements have the effect of dividing an
otherwise complete property right into a property right subject to a
claim or an easement. Muddy entitlements have the effect of
dividing otherwise clear liability into liability that cannot be valued
with certainty, short of litigation; this is not because the damages
are difficult to calculate, but because the entitlement itself is uncertain.21
1. Muddy Property
Mud may have different effects, therefore, depending on whether
the entitlement is protected by a property right or by a liability
213. In other words, the nonholder can still take and pay the full amount of damages, but
there is a possibility that he may pay too much because liability itself is uncertain.
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regime. If the right is property-based, then each possible holder of
the right has a veto on every other party's use of the property. If the
parties cannot resolve their dispute consensually, the suit will have
to go to trial and the winner will get the complete entitlement. The
effect of a muddy property rule is to force judicial resolution of the
dispute. A second effect of a muddy property rule, however, is to
deter transactions at the margin, because of the costs associated
with litigation and the risk ofjudicial scrutiny. This deterrent effect
will be beneficial, if the marginal behavior deterred violates the
norm at stake, or if the benefits of deterrence exceed the costs of
over and underdeterrence.
The process of resolving a dispute under a muddy property rule
may be costly, but it will also generate a significant amount of
information about norm-related behavior. In some cases, the
presence of a muddy rule will encourage disclosure of information up
front. In other cases, the disclosure will occur during discovery or at
trial. Either way, the information that will determine who wins the
lawsuit will not be purely, or even principally, related to the value
of the assets at stake; it will relate to the norms protected by the
muddy rule.
One relevant example of information disclosed as a result of a
muddy property-like rule arises in the data privacy context. The
aftermath of the Toysmart case and activity of the FTC in this
area has made companies skittish about transferring data without
customer consent. Indeed, the first reported instance of a dot-coin
offering to pay for personal information occurred as the result of a
sale in bankruptcy.2"' When eToys went bankrupt, they sent an
email to their customers suggesting that they shop at KBKids.com.
If the customer approved the transfer of information from eToys to
KBKids.com, KBKids.com offered them a $5.00 coupon in return. 2 s
The muddy bankruptcy regime, therefore, forced eToys to disclose
the intended transfer of private information and obtain consent.2 16
214. See Slatalla, supranote 180.
215. Id.

216. Undercurrent law, both the property-like protection of privacy entitlements and the
fuzziness of that entitlement derive from the FTC's prosecutorial discretion. See supra text
accompanying notes 136-41. This has been helpful, for the reasons described in the text, but
it is also problematic in that the FTC's influence is conditioned on prosecutorial discretion.
A true muddy property right would focus the norm-based discussions on the parties to the

transaction, rather than on a government agency, and it would influence all transactions, not

1864

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1801

On the other hand, Toysmart itself provides an example of how a
muddy property right might go awry. When every website customer
is given the right to prevent the sale of a valuable database, and
there is no collective mechanism for resolving the dispute, the result
can be what Michael Heller has termed an "anticommons," where
multiple rights of exclusion lead to the underuse of an asset. 217 As

will be discussed below, the collective procedures of bankruptcy law
provide a way to gain the benefits of muddy property while avoiding
the "anticommons" problem.
2. Muddy Liability
The information-forcing effect of muddy liability is less clear than
the information-forcing effect of muddy property. A muddy liability
rule increases the probability of a nonconsensual taking, and hence,
a dispute. Instead of a "take and pay" regime, muddy liability
creates a "take and pay if you lose" regime. Whether muddy liability
increases the likelihood of a judicial decision and/or disclosure of
norm-related information or simply increases the likelihood of a
nonconsensual taking will turn on the relationship between the
costs of litigation, the value of the right, whether the principal uncertainty is norm-based or valuation-based, and who holds the
burden of litigating. There are a lot of permutations, but a few
generalizations are possible:
" If the value of the right is small and the cost of litigation high,
then the tendency will be for nonconsensual taking of the right.
A lawsuit is unlikely, however, because in the absence of a class
action or a fee shifting statute, it will be too expensive. As a
result, whatever norm is being protected by the liability rule
will be underenforced and the muddy liability rule will not
encourage disclosure of norm-related information.
" If the value of the right is large relative to the cost of litigation,
then the liability rule will encourage transactions. The muddiness of the rule will reduce the value of the right, but increase
the likelihood of disputes. The liability rule will encourage
just the ones that were large enough to draw FTC scrutiny.
217. See Heller, supra note 23, at 624 ("When there are too many owners holding rights
of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse-a tragedy of the anticommons.").
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nonconsensual taking, and the. results will be significant
information-forcing, likely judicial decision making, and the
attendant costs of litigation.
" If the principal uncertainty is related to valuation, the information-forcing effect of the liability rule may reduce the
of litigation, irrespective of the muddiness of the
likelihood
8
rule.

21

" If the principal uncertainty is created by the muddiness of the
rule (norm uncertainty), the dispute is likely to center on normrelated behavior, and the muddy rule will encourage disclosure
of norm-related information.
" Finally, the use of a liability rule introduces credit risk as a
variable. When one party is insolvent, the deterrent effect of
damages, and hence the norm-enforcing value of the rule, will
be reduced.
Outside of bankruptcy, it is difficult to generalize about the effect
of muddy liability. Bankruptcy simplifies the analysis, however, and
highlights the distinction between muddy property and muddy
liability. Remember that in bankruptcy, liability is discharged. The
entitlement's value is reduced or even eliminated. A regime of
muddy liability is therefore turned into a regime of virtually no
liability. Muddy entitlements protected by liability rules yield no
norm enforcement, and no norm-based information forcing in bankruptcy. For the purposes of this discussion, therefore, it is possible
to ignore this complexity. To the extent that we are trying to choose
a regime for data privacy promises in bankruptcy, the effect of
bankruptcy is to eliminate the norm-enforcement effects of liability
rules. Bankruptcy law discharges claims based on personal liability.
Thus, any protection accorded to privacy promises in bankruptcy
will have to be property-based.

218. In a world of costless litigation this would not be the case. In a world where litigation
costs money, however, a reduction in the value of an entitlement increases the probability
that litigation costs will exceed the amount in dispute.
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III. MUDDY PROPERTY RIGHTS, INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE, AND
SYSTEMIC INFORMATION-FORCING
A. The Positive Externality of Muddy Property
Thus, while Ayres and Talley note the information-forcing effect
of liability rules,2 19 muddy standards can have an informationforcing effect as well, and this effect is maximized by the use of
muddy property rights. Muddy property rights increase the likelihood of disputes, and the need for judicial resolution of disputes.2 20
There is a crucial difference, however, in the nature of the information-forcing effect on the "rights" axis, as opposed to the "remedy"
axis. The information that is forced out by a liability rule relates to
valuation. This information is important to the parties, but is not
likely to be important to anyone else. Information that is forced out
by litigation relates to the norms implicated by the muddy rule. The
norm at issue may exist for the purpose of facilitating private
ordering, or it may exist to serve a public purpose such as preserving
the privacy commons and encouraging constitutive privacy. Muddy
rules, and particularly muddy property rules, encourage disputes
and force disclosure of facts about transactions and facts about
behavior. This information may be useful to the parties in connection with their private discussions. More importantly, this
information may be useful to the legal system as a whole. It is this
aspect of muddy rules that bears important consideration in
connection with personal data transactions in bankruptcy.
B. Systemic Information-Forcingand Institutional Choice
The public value of systemic information-forcing is recognized in
the political science literature. James Rogers, in an article in the
American PoliticalScience Journal,shows that rational legislatures
should actually prefer a regime in which courts have the power to
review and overturn statutes. 221 He suggests that courts have an
219. See supra text accompanying note 168.
220. To the extent that the dispute is resolved by a court, the litigation makes information

about the parties' behavior public. Even short of litigation, however, negotiation and trial
preparation generate significant amounts of information.
221. James R. Rogers,Informationand JudicialReview:A SignalingGame ofLegislative-
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informational advantage when they review statutes because they act
later in time, and because they have a specific set of facts in front of
them.222 Rogers argues that the judiciary's informational advantage
is useful to legislators.223 The judicial power to correct legislative
errors reduces the risks faced by legislatures when they legislate,
even when the courts 22
may
disagree with the legislature regarding
4
the underlying policy.

Rogers' model focuses on the power of courts to overrule statutes,
but the informational advantage held by courts also applies when
courts interpret muddy statutes. Mud allows courts to flesh out,
through the use of the common law, the norms embodied in a
statute. If the courts get it right, the legislature is vindicated. If the
courts get it wrong, the legislature can correct the result by
amending the statute. 2' The dynamic identified by Rogers should
apply even more forcefully to courts that interpret statutes, than to
courts that overturn them.
In short, a legislature may choose to legislate with open-textured
rules when it is difficult to spell out legal norms with specificity.
This may be true for a number of reasons: the legislature may not
have sufficient information with which to craft a bright-line rule, the
norm may not be sufficiently well-formed to craft a bright-line rule,
or the political consensus may not be sufficiently well developed to
craft a bright-line rule. In any of these situations, legislatures often
choose open-ended provisions.228
JudicialInteraction, 45 AM. J. POL. Sci. 84, 85 (2001).
222. Id. at 86.

223. Id. at 88.
224. Id. at 97.
225. See generallyDaniel Bussel, Textualism'sFailures:A Study ofOverruledBankruptcy
Decisions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 887 (2000) (noting that such correction does not come without
cost, and may not occur immediately).
226. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications ofPublic Choice
Theory for Statutory Interpretation,74 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988). According to Eskridge:
[Ilt is now commonplace for the Supreme Court to interpret generally phrased
distributed benefit, distributed cost statutes-the Sherman Act, section 1983,
habeas corpus law-in a common law fashion. The Court or one of the
concurring Justices is sometimes quite open about the poor fit between the
Court's interpretation of such statutes and any original legislative expectations.
Notwithstanding this extensive, and relatively open, judicial lawmaking, there
has been no hue and cry among legislators or interest groups to stop it.
Members of Congress seem happy enough that the Court is making many hard
policy judgments and filling in gaps found in these open-ended statutes.
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Some commentators treat this as a legislative cop out, leaving the
courts to make the hard decisions,2 2 but Rogers' analysis suggests
that this may also be efficient.22 8 Muddy rules create an institutional
and informational feedback loop. Muddy rules not only leave it to
courts to make decisions, the muddy rule will also have the effect of
forcing out norm-related information, exposing it to the parties, and,
to the extent that litigation is necessary, putting that information
on the record. Disputes over muddy rules get reported in the press
and in judicial decisions. Even those cases that ultimately settle
generate information for both the judiciary and for legislatures.
Legislative and regulatory action is often driven by stories that
emerge through the litigation process.
C. Muddy Propertyand Yachoo in Bankruptcy: An Illustration
Let's return to Yachoo and bankruptcy law. Yachoo wants to sell
personal information about its customers, notwithstanding its
promise not to do so. Under current law there appear to be two
alternative approaches to Yachoo's promise, neither of them satisfactory. If the promise is a promise and nothing more, then it is
protected by a crystalline liability rule. Yachoo cannot sell customer
data unless Yachoo is prepared to pay damages. If the promise is
protected by a property rule, then the rule is also crystalline. Yachoo
cannot sell the information at all unless the information holders
consent. There are two complications however: (1) Yachoo is
insolvent and may be judgment proof, and (2) there are thousands
of information holders with relatively small claims. These two

Id. at 312.
227. Id. at 288. Eskridge plays through the legislative options as follows:
A legislator seeking reelection faces the 'dilemma of the ungrateful electorate':
the good things a legislator does for an interest group are forgotten more easily
than the bad things are forgiven. To avoid this dilemma, a legislator will

typically try to avoid or finesse 'conflictual' demand patterns.... If this cannot
be accomplished, the legislator's next-best strategy will be to support an
ambiguous law, with details to be filled in later by courts or agencies. In that
way, the legislatorwill be able to assure each group that it won, and then will
be able to blame a court or agency if subsequent developments belie that
assurance.
Id. (emphasis added).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 221-24.
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complications have the effect of driving the liability and property
options further apart.
Yachoo's insolvency means that under a liability regime, Yachoo
can sell the data and avoid paying damages. The presence of diffuse
claimants means that Yachoo can sell the data, and may not even
be sued. As such, a crystalline liability rule becomes a crystalline
nonliability rule. Not only is there no information-forcing, there is
no norm enforcement either. Under a liability rule, there is no norm
enforcement in bankruptcy.
By contrast, under a property regime, Yachoo is faced with an
"anticommons" problem. Customer information will be protected
notwithstanding the inability of Yachoo to pay damages, and notwithstanding Yachoo's bankruptcy. The diffusion of the customers,
however, eliminates the principal benefit of a property rule. On the
one hand, we know that there are 20,000 customers with a property
right to their personal information. On the other hand, the costs of
contacting them and obtaining a consent to disclosure may be
prohibitive. As such, a crystalline property rule becomes an insurmountable restriction on alienation. Norm enforcement becomes
absolute, and all transactions are chilled. This is not a satisfactory
outcome, either for Yachoo or as a matter of policy.
We are at a crucial moment in the law of cyberspace. It is still
possible to choose the legal regime. Which institution is best
situated to resolve this impasse? On the one hand, Congress could
simply abandon norm enforcement and pass a law specifying that
privacy policies can be overridden in bankruptcy. This would shift
the burden of regulating transactions in personal information to the
marketplace. Website customers would be required not only to
monitor the privacy policies of the websites that they visit, but also
to make a decision about the creditworthiness of the information's
recipient. The infeasibility of such monitoring highlights the inadequacy of this market-based approach. The market does not, by
itself, provide an efficient mechanism for allocating entitlements to
nonpublic personal information. Individual disclosers are at a significant informational disadvantage when dealing with information
collectors. They neither know what they are disclosing nor how that
information is likely to be used.
Second, Congress could seek to strike the balance itself. In doing
so, it would have to recognize that any liability-based approach
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becomes ineffective upon the insolvency of the website. As such,
some form of property-based approach is necessary. Congress could
follow a number of property-based approaches. It could enact a
crystalline rule propertizing privacy promises, but, given the current
state of the market for privacy promises, this does not seem like an
appropriate response. Alternatively, Congress could enact a set of
rules for information sales that would apply to all transactions. This
is not unlike the mandatory notice and opt-out approach attempted
in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley amendments.229 One problem with this
approach is that, as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley amendments illustrate, the costs associated with getting the rule wrong can be
prohibitive. 20 The privacy market is still evolving. Different types
of personal information and different contexts may require different
levels of protection. Medical information may require absolute
protection. Financial data may require significant protection, while
taste in clothing may require relatively little protection. Congress
simply does not have sufficient information at its disposal to make
an informed, long-term decision about such privacy policies inside
or outside of bankruptcy.
Third, Congress could delegate the task of working out the details
to an agency for rulemaking.23 ' Agency rulemaking, at least in a
crystalline form, while more flexible than legislation, suffers from
the same problem. There simply is not enough understanding in the
system about how these transactions should be governed, or about
the possible abuses that might develop. Thus, crystalline rulemaking by an agency is not an adequate alternative to the market.
Finally, Congress could delegate the process of decision making
to an adjudicative process. If Congress adopts a muddy rule, or if an
agency promulgates a muddy rule, the ultimate decisions are likely
229. See Janger & Schwartz, supra note 34.

230. On the one hand, Citigroup had to distribute ninety million privacy notices. John
Schwartz, Privacy Policy Notices Are Called Too Common and Too Confusing, N.Y. TIMES,

May 7, 2001, at Al. On the other hand, it seems few read them. Press Release, Am. Bankers
Assoc., ABA Survey Shows Nearly One Out of Three Consumers Read their Bank's Privacy
Notices, June 15, 2001, availableat httpJ/www.aba.com/Press+Room/060701bankfees.htm
(last visited Feb. 25, 2003). As a reflection of the overall frustration with the notice
requirement, the FTC held a workshop on December 4, 2001 to allow discussion of problems
with the GLB privacy notices. FTC Workshop Notes: Get Noticed:Effective FinancialPrivacy
Notices, at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/glb/index.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2003)..
231. See, e.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 605, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
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to be made through the process of adjudication rather than contract.
Uncertainty about legal norms increases the likelihood that there
will be a dispute and increases the likelihood that the dispute will
have to be resolved by a court. Such delegation can be accomplished
either with a muddy property rule or with a muddy liability rule. If
the rule is going to serve a legal norm-enforcing role when a debtor
is insolvent, then it is crucial that the entitlement adopted be
treated as property rather than liability. A muddy property right
would have the effect of pushing the job of norm generation into the
adjudicative process. The benefits would be threefold: (1) a muddy
property right provides protection for privacy norms; (2) a muddy
property right encourages litigation in marginal cases, and therefore, forces information into the system, and (3) a muddy property
right allows judges to adapt rules to particular cases, while helping
to shape the governing privacy norms.
D. What Larry, Marc, and Jessica Don't Get
This view of systemic information-forcing, through the use of
muddy property rules, both complements and fills a gap in Lessig's
proposal for propertizing personal information." 2 Moreover, it also
responds to the concerns of critics like Rotenberg and Litman who
oppose propertization. 33 When speaking of data privacy, Lessig
appears to believe that propertization and technology will solve the
data privacy problem.2" 4 Following my colleague Paul Schwartz,
however, I have shown that propertization and bargaining alone
will not solve the problem, or at least not yet. Lessig sees a role
for public institutions, and for judges in particular, to aid the
development of the law of cyberspace. Lessig states that "judges
-especially lower court judges-should be stronger. Lower court
judges, because there are many of them and because many are
extraordinarily talented and creative. Their voices would teach us
something here, even if their rulings were temporary or limited
in scope."235 Lessig fails, however, to identify a mechanism for
232.
233.
148.
234.
235.

LESSIG, supra note 7, at 140.
Rotenberg, supra note 11; Litman, supra note 145; see also McGeveran, supra note
LESSIG, supra note 7, at 156-63.
Id. at 222.
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obtaining this involvement. Muddy property needs to be part of
Lessig's program. The Internet-and the way people use it, is
evolving quickly. As such, bright-line rulemaking that seeks to
govern privacy transactions precisely is likely to yield rules that are
outmoded almost as soon as they are promulgated. This suggests
that judicial decision making, rather than closed-ended crystalline
legislation, is more appropriate for governing privacy transactions.
Lessig recognizes that translating and transforming public values
in this new environment is a task that is uniquely suited to judges.
Lessig writes: "I would rather err on the side of harmless activism
than on the side of debilitating passivity. It is a tiny role for courts
to play in the much larger conversation that we need to have-but
to date have not started."2" 6 Ifjudges are to play the role that Lessig
envisions, the property rights created to protect privacy will have to
be muddy ones.
What Rotenberg and Litman don't get is that, in the era of the
dot-corn bust, many transactions in personal information will take
place in bankruptcy. Thus, propertizing private information makes
sense and may indeed be necessary. In a judgment-proof world,
commodification should be the least of Rotenberg and Litman's
worries. If Rotenberg's regulation and Litman's tort are based in
liability, privacy norms will go utterly unenforced in bankruptcy. In
short, although commodification of personality may be a risk
associated with propertization of personal information, the response
is not to fight property but to try to shape it.
Finally, there is something that neither Lessig nor Rotenberg
and Litman get. Propertization can create an anticommons. Only a
collective proceeding, like Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, provides a forum in which judicial decision making can operate to both
protect privacy norms and preserve the value of data compilations.
Lessig misses this point because he is concerned with using property
to create a privacy market, and Rotenberg misses it because he is
busy resisting property. To the extent that databases like those
maintained by Toysmart are valuable, their value lies not in the
information about any one person but in the fact that they contain
data about many people.

236. Id. at 223.
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Propertization gives every web surfer the right to veto the
transfer of her personal information. Given the number of visitors
and the small value of each datum, there is a tremendous likelihood
that these surfers will face coordination problems, if they want to
enforce their property rights or if it is in their best interests as a
group to waive them. Propertization creates the need for a collective
procedure for quieting title in customer databases. Bankruptcy
judges are uniquely situated to accomplish this task.
IV. EVALUATING THE LEAHY AMENDMENT: MUDDY PROPERTY AND
FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN BANKRUPTCY
237

A. The Leahy Amendment

The Senate's version of the Bankruptcy Reform Bill of 2001
contained a provision that was intended to insure that debtors live
up to their "privacy promises." Although the Bill did not become law,
the proposed provision is at once promising and frustrating. On the
promising side, it clearly resolves the property/liability conundrum
discussed above. The amendment would have been inserted into §
363 of the Bankruptcy Code-the section that authorizes the trustee
to "use, sell, or lease" property of the estate.3 8 The amendment
would make it clear that personal information is to be viewed as
property. It would also take the form of a muddy rule because it
would allow the bankruptcy court to override a privacy policy "after
notice and hearing."23 9 Its promise, however, ends here. Like Lessig,
the Leahy Amendment got the remedial question right but took
some wrong turns once it got down to the business of defining
norms.
The first wrong turn was that the Leahy Amendment was actually
too muddy.24 ° The provision stated that whenever a debtor has
published a privacy policy, the debtor could not disclose personal
information in a manner inconsistent with its privacy policy, unless
the court approved the sale after notice, hearing, and "consideration

237.
238.
239.
240.

See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 420, 107th Cong. § 231(a)(IXB) (2001).
11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2000).
S. 420, 107th Cong. § 231(aX1)(B).
Section 231 of Senate Bill 420 is set forth in full in the Appendix to this Article.
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of the facts and circumstances." 1 The provision was silent on which
"facts and circumstances" might justify a sale in violation of a
privacy policy. This was an extraordinarily muddy rule because it
said nothing more. In its muddiness, the statute failed entirely to
specify what, if anything, the bankruptcy judge should be doing. The
Leahy Amendment was not just muddy, it was a blind legislative
punt to the judiciary. It gave no guidance to parties trying to structure their transactions without court intervention.
Some of this concern was mitigated because the next section ofthe
statute provided for the appointment of a "privacy ombudsman" to
represent the customers whose personal information was at issue.242
Any time that a trustee proposes to sell personal information in a
manner that is inconsistent with a privacy policy, "the trustee shall
request, and the court shall appoint" a privacy ombudsman. 2 3 In

addition, the Bill gave some guidance to the ombudsman about the
nature of the values at stake:
(2) DUTIES OF OMBUDSMAN- It shall be the duty of the
ombudsman- to provide the court information to assist the court
in its consideration of the facts, circumstances, and conditions of
the sale or lease .... Such information may include a presentation

of the debtor's privacy policy in effect, potential losses or gains of
privacy to consumers if the sale or lease is approved, potential
costs or benefits to consumers if the sale or lease is approved,
and potential alternatives which mitigate potential privacy
losses or potential costs to consumers. 244
This allocation of responsibility is peculiar. The Bill told the
ombudsman what he should bargain for, but it said nothing about
how the court should exercise its discretion when bargaining fails.
The second wrong turn arose because the Leahy Amendment was
too clear. If a data sale was permitted by the dot-coin's privacy
policy, then it was to be permitted without judicial intervention.
This crystalline delegation of responsibility to the privacy marketplace relied too heavily and naively on party autonomy. If Yachoo,
241.
242.
243.
244.

S. 420, 107th Cong. § 232(a)(2).
Section 232 of Senate Bill 420 is set forth in full in the Appendix to this Article.
S. 420, 107th Cong., § 232(a)(1).
Id. § 232(aX2).
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instead of drafting a "hard" privacy policy, had adopted a policy
more like that of Amazon.com, which said, in effect, "we'll sell your
information if we feel like it," then Yachoo would be free to sell the
data without consent or court intervention.
This faith in party autonomy is misplaced. Thus far, this Article
has focused on privacy policies that promise to protect privacy. Not
all policies are of this type. Although some privacy policies contain
a promise of confidentiality, many, if not most, would be better
described as data disclosure policies, setting forth the terms upon
which data will be shared. Many of these run to six pages of fine
print. Often they go unread. Even consumers who consent under
such policies may be entitled to some protection against certain
types of data sales. In this regard, the Leahy Amendment, like
Lessig, placed too much faith in a privacy marketplace that does not
exist and is not likely to come into existence without some judicial
and legislative prodding.
On the plus side, the Leahy Amendment created a muddy property regime, provided a representative for unrepresented interests,
and created a mechanism (the bankruptcy court) for quieting
title.245 Legislation offering judicial decision making, a forum for
norm articulation, and a mechanism for overcoming coordination
and anticommons-type problems is no small accomplishment. There
was also a significant negative side to the equation, however. First,
the muddy rule articulated by the Leahy Amendment was so unclear
as to be utterly without form. Second, it was likely to have limited
impact in a world where most so-called privacy policies give the
website considerable latitude to sell customer information.
B. Towards a FIPs Default
Rather than whipsawing between undifferentiated mud to determine when a privacy policy can be modified, and a naive crystal,
that defers to any privacy policy, no matter how promulgated and
no matter how permissive, proposed privacy legislation should take
a more unified approach. All privacy promises should be subject
to a provision that propertizes personal information, articulates
broad norms for personal information transactions, and establishes
245. See Appendix, infra.
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defaults which can only be overcome by the express consent of the
parties, if at all. The Leahy Amendment was prepared to allow
bankruptcy judges to write on a tabula rasa.This was unnecessary.
Although cyberlaw is new, it is not that new. Privacy scholars like
Schwartz, Litman, and Rotenberg have spent much of the last few
years thinking deeply about the privacy norms that should govern
personal information transactions. These privacy norms, or FIPs,
have evolved over time:
During the 1970s, some eighty years after Warren and Brandeis
identified the privacy tort, the United States developed ... [Fair
Information Principles or] FIPs as a new tool for privacy
protection. By the start of the 1980s, FIPs had coalesced into
their current form. Currently expressed in statutes such as the
Video Privacy Protection Act, the Privacy Act, and the Cable
Communications Act, FIPs offer great promise for Internet
privacy. Although the expression of FIPs in different laws,
regulations, and proposals varies in details, sometimes crucially,
these standards generally require four things: (1) the creation of
defined obligations, often statutory in nature, with respect to the
use of personal information; (2) the maintenance of processing
systems that are understandable to the concerned individual
(transparency); (3) the assignment of limited procedural and
substantive rights to the individual; and (4) the establishment of
effective oversight of data use, whether through individual
litigation (self-help), government and private scrutiny (external
oversight), or some combination of these approaches.24 6
These FIPs can help establish a floor beneath which privacy
policies cannot sink and can also establish a range of defaults.2 47 If
protection of privacy norms is to be meaningful in bankruptcy,
however, such protection must be accorded the status of property.
Finally, there must be a collective mechanism available, such as the
bankruptcy court, that will provide a forum for application of FIPs
and representation of unrepresented interests when the transfer of
large databases is at stake.

246. Schwartz, Lessig's Code, supra note 109, at 779-80.
247. For a discussion of the remedy provisions of the various existing privacy statutes, see
Janger, supra note 23.
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C. Some Reflections on Forum Shopping
An additional concern about the Leahy Amendment is that it
created a rule and a mechanism that would exist inside bankruptcy
but not outside. The statute would have limited the transfer of
personal information inside bankruptcy in a way that does not exist
outside of bankruptcy. As discussed above, if a debtor seeks to sell
personal information outside of bankruptcy, it takes certain risks,
but those risks are limited by the fact that claimants are diffuse,
and a suit is unlikely. By contrast, inside bankruptcy, the sale
cannot take place without court approval.
This aspect of the rule might cause forum shopping out of
bankruptcy. Debtors might seek to sell data outside of bankruptcy
in order to avoid the procedural restrictions of the Leahy
Amendment. On the other hand, a debtor who has a nervous buyer
and wishes to sell data may find it attractive to sell the data
through bankruptcy so that it can take advantage of the Leahy
Amendment's mechanism allowing the bankruptcy court to bless the
data sale. This may cause forum shopping into bankruptcy. In
addition to property rules inside bankruptcy, therefore, another
statute should perhaps be enacted which provides individuals with
muddy property-like protection for their personal data but provides
the potential data seller with recourse to a collective proceeding like
that available in bankruptcy for facilitating sales of data in a
manner consistent with customer expectations. 2
CONCLUSION
In sum, muddy property and bankruptcy judges should play a
crucial role in the development of legal norms to govern transactions in personal information that involve an insolvent debtor.
Property rules have a unique role to play because of their capacity
to enforce norms notwithstanding the insolvency of the debtor.
Muddy property has the capacity to force disclosure of norm-related
information to the parties, the judge, and the legal system as a
whole. It therefore has the potential to foster discussion about the
appropriate norms to govern transactions in personal information
248. See id.
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and to aid in the articulation of FIPs. Bankruptcy law and, more
importantly, bankruptcy courts, have a particular role to play in
enforcing and developing such privacy norms. In the current
economy, many sales of personal information involve insolvent or
bankrupt entities. The bankruptcy court provides a collective proceeding for quieting title in personal information and determining
the terms and conditions of information sales. Bankruptcy courts
offer an attractive forum for articulating privacy norms and
remedying the anticommons problem that may arise when a website
seeks to sell its data. If privacy norms are to be developed by public
processes rather than the market with all its imperfections, the
incremental and dialogic attributes of the common law are essential.
Muddy property-based entitlements organized around FIPs are a
promising approach that should have the happy consequence of
establishing courts as guardians of information privacy.
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APPENDIX-THE LEAHY AMENDMENT TO S. 420, THE
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 2001
SEC. 231. PROTECTION OF NONPUBLIC PERSONAL
INFORMATION.
(a) IN GENERAL- Section 363(b)(1) of title
11, United States Code, is amended by
striking the period at the end and
inserting the following:', except that if the
debtor has disclosed a policy to an
individual prohibiting the transfer of
personally identifiable information about
the individual to unaffiliated third
persons, and the policy remains in effect at
the time of the bankruptcy filing, the
trustee may not sell or lease such
personally identifiable information to any
person, unless'(A) the sale is consistent with such prohibition; or
'(B) the court, after notice and hearing and due
consideration of the facts, circumstances, and
conditions of the sale or lease, approves the sale
or lease.'.
(b) DEFINITION- Section 101 of title 11,
United States Code, is amended by inserting after paragraph (41) the following:
'(41A) 'personally identifiable
information', if provided by the
individual to the debtor in connection with obtaining a product or
service from the debtor primarily
for personal, family, or household
purposes(A) means-
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'(i) the individual's first name (or initials)
and last name, whether given at birth or
adoption or legally changed;
'(ii) the physical address for the individual's home;
'(iii) the individual's e-mail address;
'(iv) the individual's home telephone number;
'(v) the individual's social security number;
or
'(vi) the individual's credit card account
number; and
'(B) means, when identified in connection
with one or more of the items of information listed in subparagraph (A)'(i) an individual's birth date, birth certificate number, or place of birth; or
'(ii) any other information concerning an
identified individual that, if disclosed, will
result in the physical or electronic contacting or identification of that person;'.
SEC. 232. CONSUMER PRIVACY
OMBUDSMAN.
(a) IN GENERAL(1) APPOINTMENT ON REQUEST- If the trustee
intends to sell or lease personally identifiable information in a manner which requires a hearing described
in section 363(b)(1)(B), the trustee shall request, and the
court shall appoint, an individual to serve as ombudsman
during the case not later than(A) on or before the expiration of 30 days after the
date of the order for relief; or
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(B) 5 days prior to any hearing described in
section 363(b)(1)(B) of title 11, United States
Code, as amended by this Act.
(2) DUTIES OF OMBUDSMAN- It shall be the duty of
the ombudsman to provide the court information to assist
the court in its consideration of the facts, circumstances,
and conditions of the sale or lease under section
363(b)(1)(B) of title 11, United States Code, as amended
by this Act. Such information may include a presentation
of the debtor's privacy policy in effect, potential losses or
gains of privacy to consumers if the sale or lease is
approved, potential costs or benefits to consumers if the
sale or lease is approved, and potential alternatives
which mitigate potential privacy losses or potential costs
to consumers.
(3) NOTICE TO OMBUDSMAN- The ombudsman shall
receive notice of, and shall have a right to appear and be
heard, at any hearing described in section 363b(1)(B) of
title 11, United States Code, as amended by this Act.
(4) CONFIDENTIALITY- The ombudsman shall maintain
any personally identifiable information obtained by the
ombudsman under this title as confidential information.
(b) APPOINTMENT- If the court orders the appointment
of an ombudsman under this section, the United States
Trustee shall appoint 1 disinterested person, other than
the United States trustee, to serve as the ombudsman.
(c) COMPENSATION OF CONSUMER PRIVACY
OMBUDSMAN- Section 330(a)(1) of title 11, United
States Code, is amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by inserting 'an ombudsman appointed
under section 332,' before 'an examiner'.

